BIKRAMJIT SINGH versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [2020] 12 S.C.R. 875 · Decided: 12-10-2020 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.F. NARIMAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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[2020] 12 S.C.R. 875
875
BIKRAMJIT SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 667 of 2020)
OCTOBER 12, 2020
[R. F. NARIMAN, NAVIN SINHA AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 167 – Penal Code,
1860 – ss. 302, 307, 452, 427, 341, 34 – Arms Act, 1959 – s.25 –
Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – ss. 3,4,5,6 – Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 – s. 13 – Default Bail – A hand grenade was
thrown on the stage of a public gathering – 22 persons were injured
seriously, out of which 3 persons died – An FIR was registered under
the provisions of IPC, Arms Act, Explosive Substances Act and
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Pursuant to this FIR,
the appellant was apprehended and remanded to custody by
Sub-Divisional Magistrate – After 90 days in custody, which expired
on 21.02.2019, an application for default bail was made to the
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate – This application was dismissed
on 25.02.2019 on the ground that the Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate had, by an order dated 13.02.2019, already extended
time from 90 days to 180 days u/s. 167 Cr.P.C. as amended by the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Revision petition by
appellant – The Special Court allowed the revision petition and
held that the Special designated Court was competent to pass an
order on any application moved u/s.45(D)(2) Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 – The Magistrate was not competent to pass
any order on any such application – On 26.03.2019, a charge-
sheet was filed before the Special Judge, in which ss. 302, 307,
452, 427, 341, 34 of IPC r/w. s.25 of the Arms Act, 1959, ss. 3,4,5,6
of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and ss. 13, 16, 18, 18-B and
20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were invoked
for offences – The Special Judge refused to grant default bail u/s.
167(2) Cr. P.C. – Later, another application for default bail was
filed on 08.04.2019 and it was also dismissed – The High Court
held that once the challan was presented by the prosecution on
25.03.2019, as the application was filed next day i.e. 26.03.2019,
the petitioner was not entitled to default bail – On appeal, held:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
The High Court got the dates all wrong – The application that was
made for default bail was made on or before 25.02.2019 and not
26.03.2019 – The charge-sheet was filed on 26.03.2019 and not
25.03.2019 – The fact that this application was wrongly dismissed
on 25.02.2019 would make no difference and ought to have been
corrected in revision – The sole ground for dismissing the application
was that the time of 90 days was extended by Sub- Divisional
Magistrate by order dated 13.02.2019 – This order was correctly
set aside by the Special Court by its judgment dated 25.03.2019,
holding that under the UAPA read with the NIA Act, the Special
Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time to 180 days under the
first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) – The fact that another application
was filed for default bail on 08.04.2019, would not mean that it will
wipe out the effect of earlier application, which was wrongly
dismissed – The right to default bail are not mere statutory rights
under first proviso to s.167(2) of the Code, but is part of the
procedure established by law u/Art. 21 of the Constitution – This
being the case, the judgment of the High Court is set aside – The
appellant entitled to be released on ‘default bail’ u/s. 167 (2) of the
Code, as amended by s. 43-D of the UAPA.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. A conspectus of the various Supreme Court
decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of
default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which
application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is
filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment
that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of
such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of
such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So
long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of
the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum
period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the
accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and
must be granted. [Para 28][913-A-C]
2. On the facts of the present case, the High Court was
wholly incorrect in stating that once the challan was pres

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