LexBIJENDER SINGH versus STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.
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BIJENDER SINGH ·A v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. MARCH 28, 2005 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Juvenile Justice Act, I 986-Juvenile-Male juvenile and female juvenile-Distinction between, on the basis of age obliterated under the 2000 Act-Separate age C limits of l 6 years for male juveniles and I 8 years for female juveniles as in the repealed l 986 Act not maintained in the 2000 Act-Age limit is l 8 years for both male and female juveniles. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Sections 20 & 1(3)-Juvenile Justice Act, 1986-Applicabi/ity of the 2000 Act to cases D pending under the repealed 1986 Act-Held: Provisions of the 2000 Act would be applicable to cases initiated and pending trial under the 1986 Act provided the accused had not completed 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001, the appointed day from which the 2000 Act came into force repealing the 1986 Act-Effect of legal fiction created in S. 20 of the 200n Act-Explained FIR was lodged alleging commission of offences under Sections 302, 364, 201 read with Sections 34 and 120B IPC. Charges were framed, whereafter respondent No. 2-accused filed application before the Judicial Magistrate, praying that he should be considered to be a juvenile under E the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Since F on the date of commission of offence, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force and according to its provisfon the accused was not juvenile being above sixteen years of age, the application was dismissed. However, the Sessions Judge reversed the ord~r and extended benefit of the 2000 Act to the accused. Complainant filed revision application before the High Court which was rejected. G The only point involved in tlfe present appeal is whether respondent No. 2, who was admittedly more than 16 years of age on 17-11-1999 when he purportedly committed offences punishable under Sections 302, 364, 201 read with Sections 34 and 120B IPC, would be given the benefits of 1131 H 1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 2 S.C.R. A the 2000 Act and would not be governed by the 1986 Act. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a juvenile means a male juvenile who has not attained the age of 16 years, and a female B juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the distin~tion between male and female juveniles on the basis of age has not been maintained. The age limit is 18 years for both male and female. [l 135-E) 2.1. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could C be tried in any court. Section 20 of 2000 Act takes care of such a situation ·stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in D relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if it has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well-known must be given its full effect although it has its limitations. [1135-G-H; 1136-AJ E Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., JT (2002) 10 SC 55; ITW Signode India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, JT (2004) 6 SC 456 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., JT (2004) 1 SC 289, relied on. F 2.2. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created. After ascertaining the purpose the Court has to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. But in so construing the. fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose G for which it is created, or beyond the language of the provision by which it is created. (1136-C-D) H State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah and Ors., [2000) 2 SCC 699, relied on. Ex Parte, Walton. In re. Levy, (1881) 17 Ch.D.746; East End Dwelling BIJENDER SINGH v. ST A TE 1133 Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, [1951) 2 A
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