BIDYA DEB BARMA ETC. versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA, AGARTALA
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562 BIDY A DEB BARMA ETC. v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TRIPURA, AGARTALA August 6, 1968 [M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, V. BllARGAVA, G. K. MITTER AND C. A. VA!DIALINGAM, JJ.) Preventive Detention Act 4 of 1950, ss. 3(3) and 3(4)-Section 3(3) requiring District Magistrate to report order of detention to State Govcrn- nzent 'fortlnvitlr'-Meaning of 'forthwith'-State Government's order •vhether ntust be com1nunicated to detenu--Communication under s. 3(4) by State Government to Central Government-Effect of de/ay- 'As soon as may be' ins. 3(4), meaning of-Detention whether mala tide-Grounds whether va11ue-Grounds of detention supplied in language not known to detenu-Effect of delay in raising ohjec1io11. The petitioners were arrested and detained on February 11, 1968 under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 bv the orders of the District ~agistratc, Tripura. They challenged thcif dcrcntion on the following among other grounds: (i) that the District Magistrate passed the orders df detention on February 9. 1968 but made his report to the State Govern- ment only on February 13 and therefore the report was not made 'for- thwirh' as required hy s. 3(1); (ii) that the Stale Government did not communicate the ap-proval to 1he detcnus and without such communica- tion the order could not be effective; (iii) that the Stale Government re- corded its approval under s. 3(3) on Fch-ruary 19 but communicated it to the Central Government only on Fchruary 22 and this was not done 'as soon as may be' within the meaning of s. 3(4); (iv) that the grounds supplied were vague: (v) that the detention order was ma/a fide. One of the petitione·r.s also relied on the f<lct that the grounds were supplied to him in English which he did not understand. HELD: (i) The word 'forthwith' has been interpreted by this Court in Jo;:lekar's case to mean the period during which the detainin~ authority could not ",vithout any fault of his ov.·n" send tht' report. In the pre<;cnt case the order of detention passed on February 9 \Vas communicated to the State Government on February 13 hut the District Magistrate in his affidavit had explained that he was occupied \\rith urgent official work and that 10th and 11th were holidays. Thus there was delay only because the report \\'<K not made on the 12th. Even i'f the meaning from the ruling in Joglekar's cao;e is applied strictly, the delay '"'as explained sufficiently. [565 C: 566A, D] A B c D E F Keshav Nilkantlr loRlekar v, The Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay. [1956] S.C.R. 653 at p. 658-60, applied. G (ii) There is no provision in the Act that the approval under s. 3(3) must be communicated to the clctenu. Section 3(3) docs not specify that the order of approval is anythin~ more than an administrative aporova1 by the State Government. If this he so the nccC5sity of communication of the approval docs not arise with that strictness as does the decio;;km under r. JOA (8) of the Defence of India Rules. A!thoueh it mav be fair even under the Preventive Detention Act to inform the detenu of all the stages throul!h v.·hich his detention passes, and it mav be desirable to have a provision to that effect included in it. the existing state of the law did not justify the imPOrtation df the strict rule to cases under this Act. [566 F, 567 D, GJ H .. • ' . --~1 A B c n. E F B. D. BARMA, v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Hidayatullah, C.J.)' 563 The scheme of the Preventiw Dotention Act is merely to approve the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued deten- tion after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order with the added approval, and what the detenu can question is the original detention and not the approval thereof. [567 HJ Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1962J Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713 and Biren Dutta & Ors. v. Chief Commissioner of Tripura & Anr., [1964J 8 S.C.R. 295, distinguished. (iii) The State Government having reached its decision on February 19, its communication under s. 3 ( 4) to the Central Government on February 22 was not so delayed that it is not covered by the expression 'as early as may be' which was explained in Joglekar's case to mean 'what is reasonably convenient'. Various things have to be done before the report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3 days i
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