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BHOOP ALLEGED SON OF SHEO versus MATADIN BHARDWAJ SON OF LAKMI CHAND

Citation: [1990] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 410 · Decided: 04-12-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
BHOOP ALLEGED SON OF SHEO 
v. 
MATADIN BHARDWAJ SON OF LAKMI CHAND 
DECEMBER 4, 1990 
B 
[K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure-Section 146 and order 20 Rule 14, 
Order 21 Rule 16--Preemption decree-Whether could be transferred 
to entitled purchaser to execute the same. 
Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Mahendergarh, in a suit, granted a pre-
C 
emption decree in respect of agricultural land in favour of one Shanti 
Devi and against the appellant and directed Shanti Devi to deposit the 
sale price by November 17, 1968. The respondent Matadin obtained a 
Deed of Assignment in respect of the said decree and thereby acquired 
the rights of Shanti Devi therein. On the strength of the said Assign-
D ment deed, he put the decree to execution by getting himself substituted 
as a decree-holder on October 15, 1980. He claimed actual possession of 
the land from the appellant. The appellant contested the execution pro-
ceedings contending that the pre-emption decree was not transferable 
and no right passed to the respondent under the deed of assignment. It 
was also contended that since Shanti Devi had failed to make the 
E deposit, the suit stood dismissed and Shanti Devi had no subsisting right 
in the decree which she could pass under the assignment deed, The 
Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Mahendergarh held that since the amount was not 
deposited on or before November 18, 1968, the suit stood dismissed and 
thus Shanti Devi had no interest which she could transfer. He accord-
ingly dismissed the execution application. Respondent Mata Din, being 
F 
aggrieved by the said order filed a revision application in the High 
Court. The High Court found that Shanti Devi look timely steps to 
deposit the sale price but due to administrative difficulties, she could 
deposit the amount only on November 19, 1968. The High Court there-
fore held that there was no delay on the part of the decree-holder to 
deposit the amount and hence the amount most be taken to have been 
G deposited within the time allowed by the decree and so the decree-
holder was competent to assign it and the assignee was entitled to 
execute tile same. The revision application was allowed and the execu-
tion was directed to proceed. The appellant has filed this appeal against 
the said order after obtaining special leave and the main contention 
amongst others advanced on bis behalf relates to the transferability of 
H the decree and the maintainability of the execution proceedings. 
410 
BHOOP v. M. BHARDWAJ 
411 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, 
HELD: The right of pre-emption is generally conferred on a COยท 
sharer in the property or on a person who claims some right over the 
property e.g., a right of way, etc., or on the ground of vicinage i.e. 
being an owner of the adjoining property. This right may be founded in 
statute or custom or personal law by which the parties are governed. 
The sole object of conferring this right on a co-sharer or owner of an 
adjacent immovable property is to exclude strangers from acquiring 
interest in an immovable property as a co-sharer or to keep objection-
able strangers away from the neighbourhood. This ript is purely 
personal and cannot be transferred to a third party for the obvious 
reason that it would defeat the very purpose ofits conferment. [416G-H) 
The parties In the instant case, clearly Intended to transfer Shanti 
Devi's interest In the pre-emptional land to Matadin. This is, therefore, 
not a case of a transfer of a mere decree with the property remaining 
vested in title In the pre-emptor. [418A] 
The document clearly shows that Matadln had to implead himself 
in place of the decree-holder as a party to the pending execution 
proceedings and then seek possession of the pre-emptional property. 
Matadin was substituted in .I>lace of the decree-holder after notice to the 
judgment-debtor. He was therefore, entitled to execute the decree. [418D] 
Matadin was entitled In law to execute the decree transferred to 
him and obtain possession of the land from the judgment-debtor. [ 418E) 
Mehr Khan v. Gu/am Rasul, AIR 1922 Lahore 300; Negeshwar v. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Taluk Singh, AIR 1930 Oudh 195; WajidAli v. Salian, [1909) ILR 31 All 
623; Zita Singh v. Hazari, [1979] 3 SCR 222; Chandrup Singh v. Data 
F 
Ram, AIR 1983 P & H l; Sarju Prasad v. Jamna Prasad, (unreported) 
S.A. from order No. 45 of 1983 decided on November 21, 1983 and 
Jugal Kishore Saraj v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] SCR 1369, referre

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