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BHIMASHANKAR SAHAKARI SAKKARE KARKHANE NIYAMITA versus WALCHANDNAGAR INDUSTRIES LTD. (WIL)

Citation: [2023] 4 S.C.R. 361 · Decided: 10-04-2023 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.R. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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BHIMASHANKAR SAHAKARI SAKKARE KARKHANE
NIYAMITA
v.
WALCHANDNAGAR INDUSTRIES LTD. (WIL)
(Civil Appeal No. 6810 of 2022)
APRIL 10, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation
Act, 1963 – s.2(j) r/w s.4 – “period of limitation” – General Clauses
Act, 1897 – s.10 – Application u/s.34(3) – Filing of, after the expiry
of 120 days but filed on the first day of reopening after the winter/
Christmas vacation – Last day of the condonable period of 30 days
u/s.34(3) had fallen during the said vacation – Benefit of s.4,
Limitation Act, if available – Held: No – Issue is not res integra – In
Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects
and Marketing Limited reported as [2012] 1 SCR 403 it has been held
that the benefit of exclusion of period during which Court is closed
is available only when the application for setting aside the award is
filed within ‘prescribed period of limitation’ and it is not available
in respect of period extendable by the Court in exercise of its
discretion – Further, the contention of the appellant on the
applicability of s.10 of the General Clauses Act is also untenable in
the light of proviso to s.10 of the General Clauses Act – No error
committed by the High Court and Trial court in refusing to condone
the delay caused in preferring application u/s.34 which was beyond
the period prescribed u/s.34(3).
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.43(1) – Plea of
the appellant that Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the
proceedings under the Arbitration Act – Held: Has no substance –
s.43(1) specifically provides that Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply
to arbitrations as it applies to proceeding in Court – Limitation Act,
1963.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and Sections
2(j) and 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 fell for consideration before
[2023] 4 S.C.R. 361
361
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 4 S.C.R.
this Court in the case of Assam Urban. Even the very issue raised
in the present appeal fell for consideration before this Court in
the case of Assam Urban. In the aforesaid decision, this Court
interpreted the aforesaid provisions and has specifically observed
and held that the benefit of exclusion of period during which Court
is closed is available only when application for setting aside the
award is filed within ‘prescribed period of limitation’ and it is not
available in respect of period extendable by the Court in exercise
of its discretion. Therefore, as such the question involved in the
present appeal is squarely answered against the appellant and
the said issue is as such not res integra. [Para 7.1][377-B-D;
380-A]
Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v.
Subash Projects and Marketing Limited (2012) 2 SCC
624 : [2012] 1 SCR 403 – relied on.
1.2 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant
that the Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the proceedings
under the Arbitration Act is concerned, the aforesaid has no
substance. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration Act specifically
provides that Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it
applies to proceeding in Court. However, as observed and held
by this Court in the case of Assam Urban, Limitation Act, 1963
shall be applicable to the matters of arbitration covered by 1996
Act save and except to the extent its applicability has been
excluded by virtue of express provision contained in Section 34(3)
of the Arbitration Act. [Para 8][380-D-E]
1.3 Now, so far as reliance placed upon Section 10 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 on behalf of the appellant is concerned,
at the outset it is required to be noted that such a contention is
untenable in light of the proviso to Section 10 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, which specifically excludes the application of
Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to any act or
proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 applies.
Reference to 1877 Act will now have to be read as reference to
Limitation Act, 1963 in view of Section 8 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. Therefore, in light of the application of Limitation Act,
1963 to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act and when
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Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically excludes
the applicability of Section 10 to any act or proceeding to which
Indian Limitation Act, 1963 applies and in light of the definition
of “period of limitatio

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