LexBHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER.
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2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 589 impossible to hold in the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial sen- teilce, and no adequate reasoP has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate. In the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence) should be allowed and that the sentence , imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored. Ordered accordingly. ·---r- BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER. [S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYA11, }AFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] Fundamental Rights, Infringement of-I.Aw void for inconsistency -'Void', Meaning of-Removal of inconsistency by amendment of the' Constitution, if revivifies the law-Constitution of India as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Arts. 13, 19(6), 31(2)-C.P. & Berar Motor Vehic!es (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act Ill of 1948). The petitioners who carried on their business as stage carriage operators of Ma<ihya Pradesh for a considerable number of years challenged the constitutional validity of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehides (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 19!l8) which amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and conferred extensive powers on the Provincial Government including the power to create a monopoly of the motor transport business in its favour to the exclusion of all motor transport operators. In· exercise of the powers conferred by new s. 43(1)(iv) a notification was issued on the 4th of February, 1955, qeclaring the intention of the Govern- ment to take up certain ro.ites. The case of the petitioners was that the passing of the Constitution and the grant of fundamental rights rendered the ltct void under Art. 13 ( 1) being inconsistent with the provisions of Arts. 19(1) (g) and 31(2), and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme CQurt in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of T.J .P. & others. On behalf of the .respondents it was contended that although as a result of the said decision the iu>pugned Act w:iS 1955 Bed iw v. T/14 SI/JU of Ullar Praduh Bose J. 1955 September 29 1955 Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and othtrs v. The Stale of Madhya Pradesh andanotlur 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955, rendered void, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, had the effect of removing the inconsistency and the Amending Act (III of 1948) be- came operative again. It was, however, contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act being void under Art. 13(1) was dead and could not be revivified by any subsequent amendment of the Constitution. It must be re-enacted. Held that Shagir Ahmad's case had no application and the con· tentions put forward by the respondents were well founded and must be accepted. That it is well-settled that the word 'void' in Art. 13 means void to the eXtent of the inconsistency with a fundamental right and the language of the article makes it clear that the entire operation of an inconsistent Act is not .wiped out. It applies to past transactions and the rights and ·liabilities accruing therefrom and continues even after the commencement of the Constitution to ~pply to non- citizens. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1951] S.C.R. 288, relied on. The true effect of Art. 13( 1) is to render an Act, inconsistent with a fundamental right, ifioperative to the extent of the inconsist- ency. It is overshadowed by the fundamental right and remains dormant but is not dead. With the amendment made in cl. ( 6) of Art. 19 by the first Amendment Act the provisions of the impugned Act were no longer inconsistent therewith and the result was that the impugned Act began to operate once again from the date of such amendment with this difference that, unlike amended clause (2) of Art. 19 which was expressly made retrospective, no rights and obli- gations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act from the date of the Commencement of the Constitution till the date of the amendment. The notification declaring the intention of the State to take over the bus routes to the exclusion of all other
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