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BHAWANJI LAKHAMSHI & ORS. versus HIMATLAL JAMNADAS DANI & ORS.

Citation: [1972] 2 S.C.R. 890 · Decided: 14-12-1971 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

890 
BHAW ANJI LAKHAMSID & ORS. 
v. 
HIMATLAL JAMNADAS DANI & ORS. 
December 14, 1971 
[C.~ A. VAIDIALINGAM AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.] 
Transfer oj Property Act. s. 116 arrd Bombay Rems, Hotel and 
Lodging House Rates (Control) Aci, 1947-Contractual renGncy deter-
mined by ¢lux of time-Tene1ncy thereafter protected by statute-
Tenant continuing in possession and landlord accepting rent-Without 
proof that both parties had the necessary intention r.here is no 'holding 
over' by the tenant within meaning of s. 116 oj Transfer of Property 
Act. 
The appe1lants were lessees of a plot of land in Bombay. The lease 
w~ granted in 1948 and was determined by efflux of time on Septem-
ber 30, 1958. However the appellants continued to occupy the land and 
to pay rent to the ~essors. On August 7, 1959 the lessors gave notice 
purporting to terminate the tenancy in the land by the end of September 
1959 on the ground inter alia that the lessors required the plot for the 
purpose of putting up construction on it. 
Since the appellants did not 
vacate the premises the bssors filed a suit on October 22, 1959 in the 
Small Causes Court, Bombay. The appellants contended in defence that 
the land was not required by the lessors bona fide for purposes of con-
struction. 
They further .contended that they were tenants holding over 
within the meaning of s. 116 · of the Transfer of Property· Act, and that 
since the landlord had accepted rent after the tenancy had determined by 
effiux of time a n~w lease had come into being and as the original lease 
was for a manufacturing purpose the new lease was by implication for 
the same purpose and consequently six months' notice was required for 
its termination by the lessors. 
The Trial Court held that the plaintiff 
required the plot bona fide for constructing a new building within the 
meaning of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of sc~tion 13 of the Bombay 
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Comrol) Act, 1947. The Court 
also helc1 that the tenancy tcrmin3.ted by efftux of time, but that the 
)cssecs continued in possession .hy virtue of the immunity from -eviction 
conferred by the aforesaid Bombay Act and so they were not holding 
over within the meaning of s. 116 of the Transr~·r of Property· Act. The 
Trial Court '3CCordingly d~crced the suit. 
In appeal the ~lppell:ltc Court 
confirmed the d-ecree. 
The High Court rejected the appellants' petition 
under Art. 227 of the Constitution. ln appe~l to this Co,.trt by special 
lc<~.vc. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
HELD : The act of holding over after the expiration of the term dres 
not create. a tenanc~ of any kind. 
Tf a tenant remains in possession after 
G 
the determination of the L:!ase the common law rule is thLlt he is a tenant 
on sufferance. 
A distinction should be drawn between a tenant con-
tinuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent 
of the landlord and a tenant doing so without1 his consent. 
The forme·r 
i~ a tenant on suffe'rence in English law nnd the latter a lr!n::mt holding 
over a tenant-at-will. In view of the concluding words of s, 116 of the 
Transfer of Property Act a lease holding over is in a bett.cr position than 
H 
a tenant-at-will. 
The assent of the landlord to the continuance of pos-
session after the determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy. 
What the section contemplates is that on one side there should be an 
offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the lcs~ce dr sub-lessee rcm!linin!! 
A 
B 
c 
BHAWANJI v. IDMATLAL (Mathew,./.) 
89.t 
in possession of the property after his term was over and on the otb:r 
side there must be a definite consent to the continuance of possession by 
the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. The basis. 
of the section is thus a bilateral contract between the erstwhile landlord 
and the erstwhile tenant. If the tenant has the statutory right to remain 
in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable 
to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into 
a contract by acceptance thereof hy the landlord. 1894 B-D; 897 0-H) 
In the case of normal tenancy a landlord is entitled where he does. 
not accept th~ rent after the notice to quit, to file a suit in ejectment and 
obtain a dceree for possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an Un-
equivocal act referable only to his desire to assent tl> the. tenant con-
tinuing in possession. T.hat is not so where a Rent Act e"-ists; and if the 
ten

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