BHARATBHAI @ JIMI PREMCHANDBHAI versus STATE OF GUJARAT
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B BHARA TBHAI @ JIM! PREMCHANDBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT OCTOBER 3, 2002 [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.] Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1985/Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1985 - Sections 3 and 15/Rule I 5(3)(b) C -Confessional statement-Non compliance of Rule-Admissibility of the st<:tement - Held, making of memorandum. and certificate under the Rule is mandatory, though language thereof is not mandatory-The discrepancy can be cured if contemporaneous record shows substantial compliance, but not by oral evidence based on the memory of Recording Officer-Penal Code, 1860- Sections 302, 307, 397 rlw Section I 20B. D Designated Court convicted the appe.llants accused u/ss. 302/1208, 307/1208, 397/1208 IPC and sections 3(1), 3(3), 3(4) and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 r/w Section 1208 !PC solely on the basis of the confessional statements of accused Nos. 7 and 8 recorded u/s 15 of TADA Act. While recording the confessional statement E police officer did not comply with the requirement of Rule 15(3)(b). In appeal to this Court appellant contended that conviction having been based solely on the confessional statement, non-compliance of Rule 15(3)(b) of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1985 F is fatal to the prosecution case. Respondent contended that in view of the deposition of police officer recording the confession that it appeared to him that the averments made by the accused were absolutely true, the non- compliance is of no consequence. G H Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: I.I. The maker of a confessional statement can be convicted solely on the basis of his confessional statement made under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. That statement is also substantive evidence againsΒ·,t his co-accused. Against the co-accused, though taken as substantive evidence as a rule of prudence, 46 BHARATBHAI @JIM! PREMCHANDBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT 4 7 to get support, the Court would look upon corroborative evidence as well. A [55-BI Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [19941 3 SCC 569, followed State through superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors., (19991 5 SCC 253; Davender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr., B (20021 5 SCC 234 and Ravinder Singh@ Bittu v. The State of Maharashtra, JT 2002 4 SC 470, relied on. 1.2. The fate of not only the accused but the co-accused as well hinges on the confessional statement recorded by a Police officer under Section 15 of the TADA Act. Such a statement cannot be recorded in a mechanical C manner. All the safeguards provided in the Act and the Rules have to be strictly adhered to. There can be no room for any latitude in the matter and manner of recording of a confessional statement. Any material discrepancy will be fatal unless satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The burden of proving confessional statements always remains on the D prosecution. It is for the prosecution to prove that the confessional statement that is being relied upon was voluntary, truthful and all safeguards were complied with while recording it. The burden of proving such confessional statement on the prosecution cannot be lightened by urging that the confession was not retracted or challenged except in the cross-examination of the witnesses. Undoubtedly, when the confession is E duly recorded and is proved to be voluntary and truthful, then it can be taken to be the most reliable piece of evidence coming from the accused himself and made sole basis of conviction, confession being an admission of the guilt. [ 55-C, E [ 1.3. Before basing conviction on confessional statement, it is necessary to examine whether all conditions for recording of confession have been fulfilled or not. What is required to be examined is whether requirements of Section 15 of the TADA Act and Rule 15(3)(b) of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules,Β· 1985, when recording the confessional statements in question, have been complied or not. [59-A; 60-DI 2.1. Writing the certificate and making the memorandum under Rule F G Β· 15(3)(b) is mandatory. The language of the certificate and the memorandum is not mandatory. The making of certificate and memorandum is not an empty formality of the Rule. It is required to be H 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A made at the end of t
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex