LexBHARAT SINGH versus MANAGEMENT OF NEW DELHI TUBERCULOSIS CENTRE, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU MARG, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS
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-- -- , BllARA:r SINGH v. KANAGEMEN'I OF NEii' DEUII nJBERCUWSIS . CENl'RE, JAWAJIARLAL NEHRU KARG, NEii' DEUII AND OTHERS. APRIL 4, 1986 [V. KHALID AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) 169 A B Iridustrial _Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 17-B - Statutory interpretation of - Applicability of to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984. · · C Statutory interpretation - Duty of Court -' Evolve the concept of purposive interpretation. Section 17-B. of. the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 came into force with effect from August 21, 1984. It provided that where in "-"Y case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of a workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the- Supreme Court the employer shall be liable to pay such workman during the pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by · him, if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period. The Labour Court in its award dated September 28, 1983 held that the termination of services of the appellant, was wrongful and illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated "'1 with continuity of , service. It directed that the appellant • would be entitled to back wages at the rate at which he was drawing them when his services were terminated. . / The management challenged the award on January 31, 1984 by filing a writ petition before the High Court. On December 12, 1984 the appellant moved an application under s. 17-B of the Act for a direction to the management to pay him full ~ wages · last drawn by him during the pendency of the writ · petition. The High Court held that the section was applicable only to cases where the awards_ were passed after its commencement, and since the award in this case · was passed prior to August 21, 1984 the section had no application. D E F G H A B c D E F G H 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 2 s.c.R. In this appeal by special leave it was contended on behalf of the management . that a section which imposes an t-· obligation for the first time cannot be made retrospective. Suell sections should always be considered prospective. Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD : 1. Section 17-B applies even to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984 if they have not become final. It~ gives a mandate to the courts to award wages where the · following three ingredients are present: (i) the Labour Court has directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer has preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or the Supreme Court, (iii) the workman has not been employed' in any establishment during such period.[181 E; 176 A; 174 E]:Ao.y 2. Section 17-B is a progressive social beneficial~ legislation. It codifies in a statutory form a right available to the workmen to get wages. There are n.o words in the section to compel the court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. The section on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed prior to the date when it came into force. Before s. 17-B was introduced there was no bar on courts for awarding wages. The workmen, of course, had no 'r right to claim it. The section recognises such a right.[176 D; · 181 C-D; 176 C; 181 DJ 3.(i) The objects and reasons of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 clearly spdl out that the delay in impleim!ntation of awards was due to the contests by employer~ which consequently caused hardship to workmen. The enactment intended to do away with this hardship by providing for the payment of wages to the workman froa the date of the awar_ till the final disposal of the case. If that be the object\ then it would be inconsistent with the progressive social · philosophy of our laws to deny to the workman the benefits of s. 17-B simply because the award was passed, for example, just a day or two before it calm! into force. It would be not only defeating the rights of the workmen but also going against the spirit of the enactment.[175 F; 176 G; 175 0-E, F~] 1- (ii) The Court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation. Though objects and reasons cannot be the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it often tilm!s aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to BHARAT SINGH v. MANAGEMENT OF N. DELHI T.B. CENTRE 171 ~nact a particular provision. The Court should give such construction
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