LexBHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. versus PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA
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A B [2015] 11S.C.R.402 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA (Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 2008) SEPTEMBER 16, 2015 [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] Limitation Act, Art. 112 -Applicability of- Do T entitled c to file suit within thirty years under the period of /imitation provided u!Art. 112-Assets and liabilities transferred by Do T (of Central Government) to appellant-company - Suit filed by appellant-company beyond the period of 3 years against the respondent-subscriber for the amount due from the D installation of telephone connection - Whether benefit of Art.112 accrue in favour of appellant-company - Held: Appellant Company is a statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government - It is distinctly independent and separate entity- Not entitled to benefit ul E Article 112- General Clauses Act, 1897- s.3(8)- Transfer of Property Act- s. 3. F Words and phrases: Expression 'Central Government' - Meaning of. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: The assets and liabilities are transferred by the erstwhile DoT in favour of the appellant-company, including the debts due from the subscribers, the G respondents, an asset which is registered with the company pursuant to the transfer of assets and liabilities as provided under Section 130 of the TP Act. Undisputedly the suit claims against the debtors/ H subscribers are beyond the period of three years of 402 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR 403 GUPTA limitation which is available. Therefore, contention that A the benefit accrued in favour of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the fact situation, has a far reaching consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government. The B expression 'Central Government' under the General Clauses Act is clearly defined. By a reading of the definition, the appellant-company which is registered under the Companies Act, though having share capital of the company owned in the name of the President is C 100% cannot be construed as the Central Government. It is for the reason that the appellant-company by registration under the Companies Act, no doubt is under the control of the Central Government as it is financed D and its administration is under the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless, the appellant- company is a separate legal entity. It also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable from E the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred under Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office Memorandum, thereby vesting in it the rights and the remedies vis-a-vis the same. No doubt, by execution of F the said instrument, it has got the actionable claim transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from the debtors and subscribers. By virtue of Article 112, a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant that it G has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. This is for the reason that the appellant-company has instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office Memorandum wherein the DoT has transferred its assets H 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R. A and actionable claims. The appellant is a company, a distinctly independent and separate entity. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due B to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. Article 112 of the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Therefore argument on behalf of the appellant- C company that it is an agency or instrumentality under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act is wholly misconceived. [Para 9 and 10] [410- D E-F, H; 411-A-G; 412- 0-H~ 413-A] E Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. vs. State of T. N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533: 2002 (2) SCR 383; AK. Bindal and Anr. vs. U. 0.1. & Ors. (2003) s sec 163: 2003 (3) SCR 928; F
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