LexBHAGWATI SARAN AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 563 tribunal has considered all the relevant factors and has come "to the conclusion that five months' bonus Standa:.i-;,., •• ,. would meet the ends of justice. We do not see any Refining co. of reason to interfere with this award. India In the result both the appeals fail and are dis- v. b h Its Worknten missed. There will be no order as to costs in ot the appeals. Gajendragadkar ]. Appeals dismissed. BHAGWATI SARAN AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH. (B. P. SINHA, C.J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Iron a~d Steel Control-Notification fixing maximum prices- W hether ultra vires-If notification discriminates between "controlled stockholders" and" registered stockholders "-Report to Magistrate- Facts constituting the offence, meaning of-New Point-Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order, r94I, Cl. II·B -Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Acl, r946 (XXIX of r9~). s. II-Constitution of India, Art. r4. A police officer made a report under s. II of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, regarding a contraven- tion of cl. .n-B(III), Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order, 1941, read with s. 8 of the Essential Com- modities Ordinance, 1955· to the Magistrate against the appellants who were registered stockholders that they had sold iron bars at prices higher than the controlled rate. After enquiry the Magis- trate framed a charge against the appellant under s. 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act •. 1946, read with cl. ll-B(III) of the Control Order. The appellants contended that the charge ought to be quashed on the grounds, (i) that the notification of the Controller fixing the maximum sale price of the several cate- gories of iron and steel was ultra vj1es the rule-making power in cl. n-B(i) of the Control Order, (ii) that the notification was discriminatory and violated Art. 14, and (iii) that the complaint could not be taken cognisance of by the Magistrate because the report of the police officer did not set out the facts constituting the offence as required by s. II of the Act. The first two grounds were raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Held, that the notification fixing the rates was intra vires cl. n-B(i) of the Control Order. The notification did not omit any class mentioned in cl. n-B(i) from its purview; it included I96I January io. I96I Bhagwati Sara'lt v. Stale of Uttar Praiesh 564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] "registered producers" and it was not shown that there were any "producers" other than " registered producers" enumerated in the notification. The notification governed "registered stock- holders"' also as they were included in the residuary category of persons other than " registered producers " and " controlled stockholders ". The notification was not discriminatory and did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. The notification no doubt permitted the grant of credit facilities and the right to charge for cutting and wastage in sales to "controlled stockholders'" but not to "registered stockholders" in regard to sales by them. Differ- entiation was not per se discrimination. There was no material to show that there was any unfair or irrational discrimination which could attract Art. 14. H ela, further, that the police report on which the prosecu- tion was launched satisfied the requirements of s. rr of the Act. The purpose of s. rr was to eliminate private persons from initi- ating prosecutions and to confine it to public servants. The requirement of the section that the report should be in writing and should set out the fact's constituting the offer.ce was to ensure that there was a record that the public servant was satis- fied that a contravention of the law had taken place. If the contravention was sufficiently designated in the report the requirements of the section were satisfied. Section II did not require the mention in the report of details which would be necessary to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused. Dr. N. G. Chatterji v. Emperor (1946) 47 Cr. L.J. 876 and Rachpal Singh v. Rex (1947) 50 Cr. L.J. 469, not applicable. Additional grounds, other than those urged before the High Court, would not lJe permitted to be raised before the Supreme Court as a matter of course, but only, in exceptional circum- stances like cas<!s of subsequ
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