BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS versus DULHIN RAMESHWARI KUER AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1951] 1 S.C.R. 603 · Decided: 07-05-1951 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA · Disposal: Disposed off

Judgment (excerpt)

S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS 
II. 
DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER 
AND ANOTHER· 
(SAIYID fAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and 
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ .) 
603 
Hindu Law-Joint family-Presumption 
of iointness-Separa-
tion of one member-Effect of-Burden of proof of subsequent state 
of family-Evidence of separation-Statement of deceased member-
Evi dence Act (I of 1872), s. 32(3). 
Though the general principle is that a Hindu family is presum-
-ed to be joint 
unless the 
contrary 
is proved, yet where it is 
admitted that one of the coparceners did 
separate himself from 
the other members of the joint . family and had his share in the 
joint property partitioned 
off for him, there is no presumption 
that the rest of the 
coparc~ners continued to be joint. There is 
no presumption on the other side too that because one 
member 
of the family 
separated himself, there has been separation 
with 
regard to all. 
It would be a question of fact to be determined in 
each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties 
whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or 
they remained united and the burden would 
undoubtedly lie on 
the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things 
on the basis of which the claims relief. 
Except in the case of reunion, the mere fact that separated 
coparceners chose to live together or act jointly 
for purposes of 
business or trade 
or in 
their dealings 
with 
properties 
would 
not give them the status of coparceners under 
the 
Mitakshara 
law. 
The statements of a particular person that he is separated from 
a joint family of which he was a coparcener, and that he has no 
further interest in the joint property or claim to any assets left 
by his father, would be statements made against the interest of 
such person, and, after such person is dead, they would be rele-
vant under s. 
32{3) 
of the Evidence · Act. The assertion that 
there was separation not only in respect of himself but between 
all the coparceners would be admissible as a connected matter 
and an 
integral part of the same statement. It is not merely 
the precise fact which is against interest that is admissible but 
all matters that are "involved in it and knit up with the state-
ment." 
The expression "joint family" 
is used in legal as well as 
in a loose sense. The fact that the said expression is used in 
1951 
May 7, 
1951 
Blurgwali 
PraJadSah 
and Other1 
v. 
Dulhin 
Rame~hwari 
x.,,, 
and Another. 
Mukherl•a J. 
604 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1951] 
describing a family in a document does not therefore nece!:sarily 
lead to the inference that the family is a joint Hindu family with 
all its legal incidents. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmCTioN. 
Civil Appeal No. 83 
of 1950. 
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 
2nd March, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at 
Patna 
(Manohar Lal and Ray, JJ.) in Appeal from 
Original Deeree 
No: 
60 of 
1944 arising out of the 
Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd December, 1943, 
of the Court of the First Sub-Judge of Saran, Ch:ipra, 
in Title Suit No. 24 of 1941. 
BaJr..shi TeJr.. Chand (Ramanugrah Prasad, with him) 
for the appellants. 
Gopinath Kunzru (D. K. Saran, with him) for Res-
pondent No. 1. 
1951. May 7. The judgmeQt of the Court was deli-
vered by 
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a 
judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Patna 
High Coun dated 2nd March, 1949, by which the learn-
ed judges reversed, on appeal, a decision of the Second 
Additional Subordinate Judge of 
Saran in Title Suit 
No. 24 of 1941. 
The controveri;y between the parties to the suit 
centres round only one question of fact, viz., whether 
the plaintiff's father, who died in 1926, was joint with 
or separate from his nephew, the defendant No. l, at 
the time of his death. If he died separate, 
it is not 
disputed that his 
properties 
would 
devolve 
by 
inheritance upon his widow and after the death of the 
widow would vest in his daughter, who is the plaintiff 
in the suit. 
If, on the other hand, he died joint, his 
interest in the joint properties would pass by survivor-
~ip to defendant No. 1, who together with his male 
descendant constitute a joint Hindu family governed 
by the Mitikshara law. 
It may be convenient at the outset to give a brief 
resume 
of the materiai facts 
as they appear in tht: 
J 
'.• 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
605 
pleadings of . the parties. One Sheo Narain Sah, who 
was the grandfath

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.