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BHAGWAN DASS JAGDISH CHANDER versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Citation: [1975] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 30 · Decided: 25-03-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

30 
A 
B 
c 
(j 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
BHAGWAN DASS JAGDISH CHANDER 
v. 
DELHI.ADYIJNISTRATION 
March 25, 1975 
[M. H. BEG, A. ALAGIRISWAMI AN.D N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.J 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-Ss. 7, 16 and 
19(2)-Joint 
trial of 1_·e.11dor a11d distributor of food article-If legal-S. 20A-Scope of. 
The appellant, a firm of ghee merchants, through its partner as A2 w;is 
charged with having sold ghee to Al (the vendor of ghee). A san1ple of that 
·gheC: purch~scd_ by the Food Inspector was found (on analysis) to be adulterated. 
·The two accused were prosecuted jointly under ss. 7 and 16 of the Prevention 
or Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 
. 
At the trial, the vendor prayed for the discharge or acquittal of the warrant-
or so that he might examine the v.rarrantor as his defence \vitness 'to prove his 
own purchase of the article under a ·warranty. The trying magistrate acquitted 
the partner of the appellant. 
The vendor was also acquitted on the ground 
that he was protected by a warranty covered bys. 19(2) of the Act. 
-
On appeal, the High Court, while maintaining acquittal of A-1, set aside 
the acquittal of the appellant (A-2). 
On the! question \Vhethcr the charge should 
be quashed because two accused were set up for trial jointly. 
HELD : The High Court was right in holding that the joint trial of the 
·<.!ppellant with the vendor was not illegal. 
[42A] 
(l)(a) Jn a suitable case, a vendor, a 
distributor, and a manufacturer 
could be tried together provided the allegations made before the Court show 
that there \Vere connecting links between their .activities so as to constitute the 
·same transaction. 
The connecting links, in a case could be provided by (i) 
the fact that a sale at an anterior stage could be viewed as the cause of the 
subsequent sale; (ii) the allegation that each of the accused parted with the 
article of food when it was in an . adulterated state and (iii) the common 
object of the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor was that the article 
st.ould reach the consumer to be used as food. The third and last link is 
decisive and must tilt the balance in favour of legality of a joint trial of the 
parties concerned. 
.[41~C-DJ 
(b) A rnens rea as a particular state of mind which could be described 
as guilty or wrongful 'vas not needed, and, therefore, could not provide the 
connecting link between the co-accused in a trial for such an offence in order 
to constitute the same transaction. 
[39D] 
Sarjoo 'Prasad v. The State of Uttnr Pradesh, A.LR. 1961 S.C. 631, referred 
to. 
(c) Where 
~ jOinder of several accused persons concerned dealing in 
different \Vays with the same adulterated article of food at different stages 
is likely to jeopardise -a 
fair trial, a separate trial ought to be ordered. It 
is not proper to acquire or discharge an accused person on this ground alone. 
The order of separate trial in a case where preJudice to an accused from a 
joint trial is apprehended is enough. 
A joint trial of such accused persons is 
not nb' initio illegal. [40A] 
Jt·. N. Knn1dar & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [19741 lS.C.R. 
157 Ill' 161 and Kadiri Kunhammad v. The State of Madras. 
A.I.R. 
1960, 
· S.C. 661 @663, followed. 
f 
,, 
,l 
j 
., 
BHAGW.AN DASS V. DELHI ADMN. (Beg, J.) 
31 
(2) Neither S. 7 nor S. 14 of the Act bars trial of several offences by .A 
the same accused person, be he a manufacturer, a distributor or a last seller 
referred to as "the vendor" in S. 14 of 
the 
Act. . The 
definition• 
<.)f 
"sale" in sub-s. (xiii) of 
the Act. 
is 
wide 
enough 
to 
include 
every 
kind of .sefler. Every seller can be prosecuted for an offence created by s. 7 
of the Act. 
The mere fact that, for purposes of S .. 14, the .perron who 
could be the last seller is described as "the vendor'', could not affect a liabi-
li_ty. fo~ an offence under s. :; ·_of the Act_ by a sale of an.~ar.ticle · oT food 
...;· 
'vhich is found to be 
adulterated. 
A sale of an 
~rticle of .food 
by a 
D 
umanufacturer, distri!tOr, or dealer" 
is , a distinct 
and· separable offence. 
Section 14 was not· 
ant to ·carve out an exemption in favour of a <listri· 
butor ·o:r a manufact 
r who sells articles of food; found to be adulterated, 
irrespective of the qqesiion whether any warranty was given for them. [36C·F1 
(3)(a) The special provisions contained in Ss. 19(2) and 20A do not take 
away or deroga~e from the effect of the otdinary provisions ·of · the Ja\V 
\Vhich enable sepa

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