BHAGAT SINGH ETC. versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
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A BHAGAT SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. DECEMBER 8, 1998 B [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO JJ.] Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4(1), 5-A, 6 and 17(4)-Acquisition of land for setting up C market yard-Inquiry under section 5-A dispensed with on the ground of urgency-Delay of one year between the Notification and the declaration-- Writ petition challenging validity of land acquisition proceeding-Dismissed- On appeal-Held, subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry based on sufficient material cannot be faulted-Delay caused has no great impact D on the subjective satisfaction. Sections 4(1) and 6--Change of public purpose-Land reserved for light industries' in the Master Plan-Acquisition for construction of market yard-Validity of-Held, acquisition will be valid even if it is for a public purpose other than the type mentioned in Master Plan/Zonal Plan- £ Subsequently the beneficiary of acquisition can move the competent authority for suitable modification of Master Plan. Section 48-Representation for withdrawal of land acquisition proceedings-Permissibility of The State Government by a Notification dated 5.10.1993 under section F 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 acquired certain lands for construction of a market yard. The provisions of inquiry under section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with on the ground of urgency. Declaration under section 6 was issued in 6.10.1994 acquiring the land. The appellant-land-owners' writ petitions challenging the validity of land acquisition proceedings were G dismissed. Hence the present appeals. The contention of appellants was that there was a delay of full one year between the notification under section 4(1) and declaration under sect,!?.n 6. Thus there was no urgency requiring dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A; the land acquired was reserved for 'light industries' under the Master H Plan and therefore it was not permissible to acquire the land for market 404 .. BHAGAT SINGH v. STATE 405 yard. A Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD. 1.1. The High Court was right in holding that the respondents were amply justified in dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A by exercising powers under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. B [411-F) 1.2. The subjective satisfaction for dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A is based on sufficient material and cannot be faulted. The photographs as to the filthy state of the present Mandi with garbage and stray cattle and pigs show that the place is so loathsome that it will be precarious and C perhaps hazardous to store vegetables foodgrains in the existing market. Therefore, the urgency clause was rightly invoked by the Government There are also enough precedents in connection with acquisition of land for markets where Sections 5-A has been dispensed with and such action was upheld. [409-A-B-C) Hari Singh and ors v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1984)2 SCC 624 and Union of India v. Praveen Gupta and Ors., (1996)9 JT 624, relied on. Satyendra Prasad Jain (S.P. Jain) and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1987) A.W.C. 382 and Kailasawati v. State of U.P., AIR (1978) All. 181, approved. D 1.3. The delay caused between section 4(1) Notification and section 6 E declaration has no great impact on the subjective satisfaction arrived at for dispensing with inquiry under section 5-A of the Act. [411-E) 2. There is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor F will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time acquisition is made. It will be for the G beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the H I 406 S
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