BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI versus PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD

Citation: [2013] 6 S.C.R. 529 · Decided: 29-05-2013 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

[2013] 6 S.C.R. 529 
BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI 
v. 
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., 
HYDERABAD 
(Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2007) 
MAY 29, 2013 
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Death of woman due to burn 
injuries - Acquittal of accused-appellant (divorced husband C 
of deceased) by trial court - But conviction by High Court ul 
s.302 - On appeal, held: There were three dying declarations 
- First two declarations did not implicate the appellant - The 
third declaration dated 28.4.2000 implicated the appellant but 
the same being full of contradictions does not inspire 
D 
confidence - Settled legal proposition that in case there are 
apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be 
unsafe to convict the accused - In such a fact-situation, the 
accused gets the benefit of doubt - Trial Court found material 
inconsistencies in the case of the prosecufion and did not see 
E 
any reason to rely upon the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000 
- High Court did not consider the matter in correct perspective 
nor observed the parameters laid down by Supreme Court to 
interfere against the order of acquittal - Order of trial courl 
restored. 
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 - Multiple dying declarations -
Appreciation of. 
Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Scope of interference. 
A woman died due to burn injuries. One day after the 
incident, on 15-4-2000, the statement I complaint of the 
deceased was recorded by the head constab~ of police 
wherein she stated that a stove full of kerosene oil fell 
529 
F 
G 
H 
530 
$UPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2013] 6 S.C.R. 
A upon her and thus, she suffered burn injuries. On the 
same day, her dying declaration was recorded by the 
Executive Magistrate after getting certificate of fitness 
from the Doctor, wherein a similar statement had been 
recorded. 
B 
A fortnight later, on 28.4.2000, her another dying 
declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate 
wherein she alleged that while she was cooking food and 
all the students had gone home, the appellant (the 
C divorced husband of the deceased) poured kerosene on 
her body and threw the burning stove on her, due to 
which She received severe burn injuries. 
The trial Court acquitted the appellant, but on appeal 
by the State, the High Court reversed the acquittal and 
D convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and 
sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. Hence, the 
instant appeal. 
E 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HE;LD: 1. The first two dying declarations were made 
in the Government Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram 
and the Magistrate had reached there on being called by 
the police. There is no inconsistency between the first 
two dying declarations and it is evident from the said 
F dying declarations recorded on 15.4.2000 that both of 
them had been recorded in the Government Headquarter 
Hospital, Vijianagaram. The third dying declaration makes 
it evident that on 15.4.2000 she had not been taken to the 
Government Hospital and her in-laws were not available 
G on 14.4.2000. Her husband had been treating her at home 
and had also given her injections for two-three days. Her 
parents-in-laws reached on 15.4.2000 from Rajahmundry 
and then she was admitted to the private hospital on 
16.4.2,000. As she could not recover therein, then she was 
H trans.ferred to Government Headquarter Hospital, 
BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH 531 
COURT OF AP., HYDERABAD 
Vijianagaram on that day. [Para 8] [539-0-F] 
2. The Trial Court found material inconsistencies in 
the case of the prosecution and did not see any reason 
whatsoever to rely upon the dying declaration dated 
28.4.2000 as the contents thereof were admittedly false 
and could not be relied upon. If the dying declaration has 
been recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 15.4.2000 
A 
B 
in the Government hospital, the question of her being 
treated by her husband for 2-3 days and then her 
admission in a private hospital did not arise at all. Her 
C 
version that she was admitted to the Government 
Headquarter hospital, Vijianagaram on 16.4.2000 could 
not be true. The contents of the dying declaration dated 
28.4.2000 being full of contradiction do not inspire 
confidence. [Para 13] [541-A-C] 
3. Admittedly, there was a divorce between the 
parties. Therefore, the question of demand of dowry or 
ill-treatment or harassment could not arise after 8 years 
D 
of divorce decree by the court. The mot

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