LexBANT SINGH GILL versus SHANTI DEVI & ORS.
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A B c D E F G DANT SINGH GILL v. SHANTI DEVI & ORS. March 1, 1967 (K. N. WANCHOO, R. S, BACHAWAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.J Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952· (38 of 1952) and Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958)-Swit for tjectment filed under 1952 Act- '[tfl<Jnt's application under s. 50(2) of tht 1958 Act claiming that suit had abated-Application dismissed by trial court-Appeal filed under s. 34 of 1952 Act-Right of appeal whether governed by 1952 Act or 1958 Act-Effect of s. 51 of 1958 Act. A suit for ejectment on the ground of failing to pay arrears of rent was instituted against the appellaat by the respondents under the provi- sions of the Delhi & Ajme'r .Rent Control Act, 1952 on February· 27, 1958. On February 9, .1959 the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came into force and became applicable to the premises in question. On March 13, 1961 the appellant, relying on the provisions of s. 50(2) of the Act of 1958, filed an apphcation before the trial court requesting it to hold that the suit had abated on the ground that the suit related to premises the construction of which bad been completed after the !st day of June 1951 but before the 9th day of June 1955. The trial court, not satisfied that the premises was constructed during the said period,, rejected the application. An appeal purporting to be under s. 34 of the 1952 Act was filed before the District Judge who held that the order of the trial court was under the Act of 1958 so that no appeal lay. The High Court dismissed the appellant's revision application. Appeal to this Court v.·as filed under Art. 136 of the Constitution. HELD: (i) The saving clause of stib-s. (2) of s. 57 makes it clear that the present suit which was pending under the Act of 1952 was to be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of that Act though under the first proviso the court deciding the suit was required to have regard to the provisions of the Act of 1958. [62 EJ Further the second proviso to s. 57(2) of the Act of 1952 laid down that the provisions for appeal under the Act of 1952 were to continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder. Con- sequently the right of appeal against the order continued to be governed by s. 34 of. the Act of 1952. (62 O·HJ However the trial Judge had only decided a preliminary issue and the order not being a final order was not appealable under s. 34 of the Act of 1952. (63 HJ Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 310, relied on. Ram Charan Das v. Hira Nand, A.LR. 1945 Lah. 298, referred to. (ii) The appellant's application was not one under s. 33 of the Act of 1952 and the order disposing it of was not a final order on that H ground either. [64 C-D] It was open to the appellant to challenge the correctness of the ded- sion of the trial court in the appeal against the decree if passed against him. [64 E-FJ 60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1967] 3 S.C.R. CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2207 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 21, 1966 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 319-D of 1965. Pritam Singh Safeer, for the appellant. S. P. Mahajan and Lily Thomas, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. A suit for ejectment on the ground of failing to pay arrears of rent was instituted against the appellant, Bant Singh Gill, by the respondents under the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (No. 38 of 1952)-hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1952", on the 27th February, 1958. On 9th February, 1959, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (No. 59 of 1958 )-hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1958'', camo into force and became applicable to the premises which were the subject-matter of the pending suit. On 13th March, 1961, the appellant, relying on the provisions of s. 50(2) of the Act of 1958, filed an aoplication before the trial Court requesting it to hold that the suit had abated on the ground that the suit related to premises the construction of which had been completed aftt:r the 1st day of June, 1951, but before the 9th day of June, 1955. The trial Court, after taking into account the evidence, recorded a finding that the appellant had failed to prove that the premises had been completed during this period mentioned in s. 50(2) of the Act of 1958. and, consequently, rejected the
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