BANK OF BARODA versus SADRUDDIN HASAN DAYA AND ANR.
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A BANK OF BARODA 1 ' . v . SADRUDDIN HASAN DAY A AND ANR. DECEMBER 12, 2003 B [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.] Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Sections 2(b) & 20-Consent decree passed by Supreme Court upon an undertaking given by contemnors not f to alienate aitached properties till payment of defaulted amount to Bank- c Default in payment of amount-On execution before Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bank came to know that contemnors have entered into another similar consent decree with another Bank before High Court placing same properties under attachment-Contempt petition by Bank-Held, contemnors guilty of civil contempt for wilful breach of undertaking given to this D Court-Hence sentenced to imprisonment. Petitioner Bank filed a suit against respondents for recovery of certain amount of money. The respondents were granted unconditional leave to defend the Suit passed in Summons by the trial court. During 1. E the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the petitioner and the respondents entered into a settlement. The appeal was disposed of by ,,.-โข this Court with a consent decree. Under the settlement, the properties of the respondents would remain attached with the petitioner till the payment of the defaulted amount with interest in instalments. The respondents further undertook not to sell, mortgage, alienate, encum- ,. F her or charge the properties attached till the payment is made to the petitioner. The respondents committed default in payment of first ยท instalment to the petitioner. The petitioner moved Debts Recovery Tribunal for execution of the consent decree passed by this Court. The petitioner came to know at the time of execution that the respondents G have entered into another consent decree with another Bank before the i' High Court without disclosing the consent decree passed by this Court and placing the same properties under attachment. The respondents further filed written submissions before t~e Tribunal contending that the consent decree passed by this Court is without jurisdiction. Hence, H the petitioner filed a Contempt Petition against the respondents before 764 BANK OF BARODA v. S.H. DAY A 765 this Court. The petitioner contended that the respondents alienated the attached properties in violation of the consent decree passed by this Court by entering into a consent decree with another Bank approved A by High Court; and that they have made contemptuous statement before the Debts Recovery Tribunal that the decree passed by this B Court is a nullity. The respondent-contemnors contended that non-compliance of the terms of a consent decree by them does not amount to contempt of Court; that the petitioner has failed to discharge the burden beyond C reasonable doubt to prove that the respondents have committed Contempt of Court; and that the contempt proceedings initiated by the petitioners is barred by limitation under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Allowing the Contempt Petitions and sentencing the contemners, D the Court HELD : 1.1. After filing the consent terms and passing of the decree by this Court, it was not open to the respondents to file consent terms in another suit whereunder the same properties were to remain E under attachment till the decree passed in the suit was satisfied and in the event of the decree in the suit becoming executable, the Court Receiver would have power to sell the properties and to pay over the sale proceeds to the plaintiff of the suit. It is therefore clear that by the consent terms filed by the respondents before the High Court in F the suit instituted by another Bank on the basis of which the another suit was disposed of, the undertaking given before this Court not to encumber or charge the attached properties to anyone until the decree was satisfied was clearly violated. [775-C-El 1.2. A lega.I plea taken by a party that a decree passed by a Court G (including Supreme Court) is without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity will not normally amount to a contemptuous statement. It is not the case of the respondents that any fraud was played upon them by any party when they entered into a settlement and signed the minutes of the decree. It appears that the respondents from the very inception H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A had no intention of paying the amount, but they agreed for a settlement and consent terms only for the purpose of gaining
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