LexBALKRISHNA SAVALRAM PUJARI AND OTHERS versus SHREE DNYANESHWAR MAHARAJ SANSTHAN & OTHERS
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1959 March 26. 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. BALKRISHNA SAVALRAM PUJARI AND OTHERS v. SHREE DNYANESHW AR MAHARAJ SANSTHAN & OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.) Limitation-Suit for possession of Sansthan by hereditary wor- shippers on ouster by trustees-Period of limitation-Trustees, if in possession adversely to plaintiffs-Ouster, if a continuing wrong -Indian Limitation Act, I908 (9 of I908), Arts. I20, I24, s. 23. The appellants who were the hereditary worshippers, called Guravs, of the Shree Dnyaneshwar Sansthan of Alandi, claimed to be its owners. The respondents as trustees of the said Sansthan dismissed eleven of the Guravs in 1911~ served a notice on the rest calling upon them to agree to act according to the orders of the Temple committee and appointed six Brahmins to carry on the services of the Sansthan. The Guravs did not agree and sued the respondents for a declaration of their rights of ownership and consequential reliefs. That litigation ended in the High Court in 1921 with the result that their claim of ownership stood rejected but their rights as hereditary worshippers were left open. Thereafter 'the Gura vs took forcible possession of the temple on July 25, 1922. The trustees brought a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act on September 12, 1922, and obtained a decree on November 4, 1932. In execution of that decree the Guravs were dispossessed. The suits, out of which the present appeals arise, were filed by the appellants against the trustees for declaration of their rights as hereditary servants of the Sansthan, a permanent jnjunction restraining the trustees from obstructing them in the exercise of the said rights and accounts. The respondents claimed that the appellants were servants of the Temple committee and had no hereditary rights as claimed by them;· even if they had, their claim to such rights was barred by limitation. The trial Court decreed the suits. In appeal the High Court, while agreeing with the trial court on the merits, dis- agreed on the question of limitation, held the suits to be barred by limitation under art. 120 of the Limitation Act, the cause of action arising either on the filing of the s. 9 suit by the respon- dents or, in any event, on the date when the said suit was decreed, s. 23 of the Act having no application, and allowed the appeals. It was contended on behalf of the appellants in this Court that the suits were governed by art. 124 of the Limitation Act, and even if art. 120 applied, s. 23 saved limitation. Held, that the High Court was right in holding that art. r20 an<:! not art. 124, of the Limitation Act applied and that s. 23 had no application to the suits in question. (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 477 Article 124 of the Limitation Act applies only where the 1959 cause of action for the suit is wrongful dispossession of the plain- tiff and adverse possession by the defendant in respect of the Balkrishna hereditary office in question. · In such suits, the contest usually Sava/ram Pujari is between rival claimants to the heniditary office and not & Others between such claimants and trustees. It is impossible to ignore v. the provision of Col. 3 to that article in deciding its applicabi- Shree Dnyaneshwar lit y. Maha raj Sans than Kunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, [1904] I.L.R. 28 & Others Born. 567 and Jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee Lall Johurry, [19II] 15 C.W.N. 882, held inapplicable. Thathachariar v. Singarachariar, A.LR. 1928 Mad. 377, ap- proved. Annasami v. Advarachari, I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 275, distin- guished. Jhalandar Thakur v. ]harula Das, [1914] I.L.R. 42 Cal. 2444, referred to. Section 23 of the Limitation Act refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. A continuing wrong is essential- ly one that creates a source of continuin~ injury as opposed to one that was complete and makes the doer liable for such con- tinuance. A completed injury would not be a conti11uing wrong even though it might give rise to continuing damage. Thus tested, the injury to the appellants resulting from the decree obtained by the trustees in the s. 9 suit, which amounted to a ouster, was complete at the date of the ouster and s. 23 of the Limitation Act could not apply so as to save limitation. Choudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadev Asram Prasad Saki Bahadur, [1939] I.L.R. 19 Pat. 208 and Khair Mohammad
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