BALDEVDAS SHIVLAL & ANR. versus FILMISTAN DISTRIBUTORS (INDIA) (P) LTD. & ORS.
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A B c D E F G H BALDEVDAS SHIVLAL & ANR. v. FILMISTAN DISTRIBUTORS (INDIA) (P) LTD. & ORS. April 29, 1969 [J. C. SHAH AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 1, 115-Consent decree whether· operates as res judicatc.-Trial Court disallowing objection to certain questions in cross-examination--Order disallowing question is not a 'case· decided' ·within meaning of s. 115-High Court's jurisdiction in revision. R and F who held a cinema building in Ahmedabad on lease entered on November 27, 1954 into an agreement with respondent no. 1 giving the latter a right to exhibit cinematograph films in the said building. Later· respondent no. 1 filed suit No. 149 of 1960 to assert his .right to exhibit films in the building. The suit resulted in a comp'romise decree. In pursuance of the compromise a further agreement dated December 1, 1960 was executed betweeu the parties. However in 1963 respondent no. 1 again filed a suit claiming as a sub-lessee or as lessee a right to exhibit films in the said building and praying that the defendants be restrained from interfering with that right. The suit was filed under s. 28 of the Bombay Rents, }Jotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 in the Court of Small Causes. In this suit respondent no. 1 asked the court to try additional issues Nos. 11, 12 and 13 as preliminary issues. In issue no. 11 the question raised was whether the consent decree in the earlier suit operated aa res judicata so that R & F could not question that the agreements betw.aen them and respondent no. 1 constituted a lease. Js3ue no. 12 raised the question whether in view of the consent decree R & F were estopped from leading evidence and asking questions in cross-exami· nation to show that the said agreement~ did not constitute a lease. Issue No. 13 raised the question whether s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act debarred R & F from leading evidence to the effect that the documents in question did not constitute a lease. The Trial CoUrt refused to try these as preliminary issues and its order was upheld by the High Court. At the hearing of the case when the cc>unsel for the defendants sought to ask a witness for ~pondent No. 1 whether the agreement dated N ovcm- ber 27, 1954. was a commercial transaction and not a lease respondent No. 1 objected to the question. The objection was disallowed by the trial rourt. In revision under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court did' not interfere with the triai court's order in respect of issues Nos. 12 and 13. In respect of issue No. 11, the High Court held that the agteement dated November 27, 1954 must in view of the consent decree in suit No. )49 of 1960 be held to be a lease, and that the consent decree created a bar of res judicata in respect of the issue whether the said aJ:reement created a lease. The defendants-appellants appealed to this. Court. HELD : (i) The High Court had no jurisdiction to record any finding on the issue of res judicata in a revision application :filec! against an order refusing to uphold an objection to certain question asked to a witness under examination. The Court erred in proceeding to decide matters on which no decision was till then recorded by the trial court and which could not be decided by the High Court until the parties had opportunity of leading evidence thereon. [ 441 Fl .(36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970) l S.C.R (Ii) By ordering that a question may pr"P"rly be put to a witness who A wu exammed, no case was decided by the Trial Court within the meaning of s. 11 S of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression 'case' is not limited ia its impoit to the entirety of the matt.er in dispute in a proceed- ing. Such an interpretation may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed. But equally, it is not every order of the court in the course of a suit that amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided onJy if the court adjudicates, B for the purpose of the suit, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. [441H-442C] MGior S. S. Khllllna v. Brig. F. /, Dillon, ( 1964) 4 S.C.R. 409, referred to. (iii) A consent decree, according to the decisions of this Court, docs not operate as res judicata.. because a consent decree is merely tbe record of a contract between the panics to a suit, to \\-hich is superadded the C· seal of the court. A matlcr in c
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