BALBIR SINGH versus STATE OF DELHI

Citation: [2007] 7 S.C.R. 1102 · Decided: 21-06-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
BALBIR SINGH 
v. 
ST A TE OF DELHI 
JUNE 21, 2007 
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.] 
Terrorist and Disruption Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-ss. 3, 4, 5, 
6 and 20A(2)-Absence of sanction of the Police Commissioner under 
C s.20A(2)- Effect of-Held: Designated TADA Court consequently had no 
jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and take cognizance of the offence-But 
that did not lead to acquittal of the accused-On subsequent grant of sanction, 
proceedings could be legally continued against the accused-Arms Act, 
1959-ss. 25 & 26--Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s.300. 
D 
By order dated 19.4.1997, the Designated TADA Court had held that in 
E 
absence of sanction of the Commissioner of Police as required under sub-
section (2) of Section 20-A of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1987, proceedings against Appellant-accused became non 
est. 
Pursuant to the said order, sanction was accorded and the Designated 
TADA Court issued summons on 2-3-2002 by the impugned order after over-
ruling objections raised by the Appellant that there was virtual infraction of 
Section 300, CrPC. The Court held that proceedings could be legally continued 
against the Appellant and accordingly took cognizance of offences punishable 
under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the TADA Act and Sections 25 and 26 of the 
F Arms Act, 1959. 
In appeal to this Court, it is contended that the view expressed by the 
Designated TADA court is unsustainable and that after a long passage of time 
and the expiry of currency of Statute itself (i.e. TADA) the continuance of the 
G proceedings would be sheer abuse of the process of the Court. 
H 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD:l.1. The position seems to be unexceptionable that the concerned 
Court by judgment dated 19.4.1997 could not have directed acquittal In the 
1102 
, 
, 
BALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI 
1103 
absence of sanction the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter A 
and take cogniz.ance of the offence. But the order passed in that regard cannot 
- lead to acquittal of the accused. !Para 7111105-D) 
1.2. Where a person has done something which is made punishable by 
law he is liable to face a trial and this liability cannot come to an end merely 
because the court before which he was placed for trial forms an opinion that B 
it has not jurisdiction to try him or that it has no jurisdiction to take 
cognizance of the offence alleged against him. I Para 12111106-C, DI 
Mohd. Safi v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1966) SC 69, relied on. 
Bas Deo Agarwala v. King Emperor, AIR (1945) FC 16 and Falli Mui/a C 
Noor Bhoy v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 264, referred to. 
2. So far as applicability of Section 300 (1), CrPC ir concerned, 
·essentially the conditions for invoking the bar are : (i) the Court had 
jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the accused and (ii) the Court has D 
recorded an order of conviction of acquittal and such conviction/acquittal 
. remains in force. [Para 121 (1106-E, F) 
3. The question relating to delayed sanction needs to be noted in the 
background of what this Court observed in an earlier case. It is neither 
advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer E 
limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The criminal courts are not 
obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse 
of time. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any 
court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as 
mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge 
the accused. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be a better F 
protector of such right than any guidelines. 
(Para 13) [1106-F; 1107-C, D, F, G] 
P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, [20021 4 SCC 578, relied 
on. 
4. The impugneJ order passed by the Designated Court does not suffer 
from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, the trial court is 
requested to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within 6 
months from the date of communication of this order. (Para 141 (1108-B, CJ 
G 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 844 of H 
1104 
A 2002. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2007) 7 S.C.R. 
From the Order dated 2.03.2002 of the Designated (TADA) Court II, 
Delhi in Session Case No. 48 of2001. 
Rajiv Dutta, H.S. Bhatti, Namata Chopra and R. Nedumaran for the 
B Appellant. 
Ashok Bhan and D.
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