LexBALBIR SINGH AND ANR. versus STATE OF PUNJAB
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B BALBIR SINGH AND ANR. v. ST A TE OF PUNJAB SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 (S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860-Sections 34, 302, 304B, 307 and 498A -Evidence Act, 1872--Section 32-Woman died of burn injuries-Two dying declarations C made before Doctor and Police respectively-Charges framed against husband and mother-in-law for offences under sections 498A and 302 rlw 34 !PC or in the alternative under 304B r!w 34 /PC-Trial court convicted both the accused under sections 302 rlw 34 /PC and 498A !PC -High Court confirmed their convictions and sentences-Correctness of-Contention of the accused that dying declarations are invalid as they were not made before a D Magistrate-Held, law does not provide that a dying declaration should be made before a Magistrate-On facts, dying declarations are made voluntarily- Hence, convictions and sentences of the husband under both the sections upheld -Conviction of mother-in-law under section 302 rlw 34 !PC is set aside giving benefit of doubt due to inconsistencies between the two dying declarations. E Deceased, who is the wife of appellant no. I, sustained burn injuries and was admitted in a hospital. The doctors attending on her recorded a dying declaration wherein she had stated that when she went to bathroom, her husband came from behind, poured kerosene oil on her, ignited her and locked F the door of the bathroom from outside. She further stated in the dying declaration that when she raised an alarm, her neighbours rescued her and brought her to the hospital. A First Information Report was lodged with the police. Sub-Inspector of police came to the hospital and recorded a second dying declaration wherein she had stated that her husband and her mother- in-law (appellant no. 2) had set her on fire. On the death of the deceased, G. prosecution framed charges against the appellants under section 302 read with section 34 IPC or in the alternative under section 3048 read with section H 34 IPC. The appellants were also charged under section 498A read with section 34 IPC. The trial court convicted the appellants under sections 302 ~ and 498A IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment and 3 years 636 ... BALBlR SINGH v. STA TE OF PUNJAB 637 respectively. The High Court, in appeal, confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the dying declarations made by the deceased are invalid as they have not been made before a Magistrate and hence their conviction and sentence should be set aside • Partly allowing the appeal, the Court A l B HELD:t.1. The law does not provide that a dying declaration should be made in any prescribed manner or in the form of questions and answers. Only because a dying declaration was not recorded by a Magistrate, the same by itself may not be a ground to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. When a C statement of an injured is recorded, in the event of her death, the same may also be treated to be a First Information Report. Dying declaration must be voluntary. It should not be tutored. The effect of the statement being not recorded before a Magistrate would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast .rule can be laid down therefor. (643-G-H; 644-A-BJ State of Karnataka v. Shariff. (2003( 2 SCC 473; Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar & Ors., (199814 SCC 517 and Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002( 6 sec 710, relied on. Kam/a (Smt.) v. State of Punjab, ( 19931 I SCC I, distinguished. 1.2. In the first dying declaration, appellant No. 2 - mother-in-law - was D E not named. Appellant no. I - husband's -culpabilit) has categorically been stated by the deceased in both the dying declarations. She had categorically stated that her husband had poured kerosene oil upon her and upon igniting, F locked the door of the bathroom from outside. She was rescued by the neighbours. He was forced to bring her to the.hospital by the neighbours. A case of suicide, therefore, must necessarily be ruled out. In view of the manner in which she made her statement before the doctors, it is difficult to hold that her first statement was not voluntary or was tutored. For arriving at the said finding, the time factor is also significant. (645-B-EI G Jai Karan v. State of Delhi (NCT), (19991 8 SCC 161; State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay S/o Digambarrao Rajhans, (2004) 13 SCC 314 and Muthu Kutty & Anr.
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.