LexBAJWA & ORS. versus STATE OF U.P.
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A J.) c D E F G H 571 BAJWA & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. March 6, f973 (A. ALAGIRISWAMI. J. D. DUA AND C. A: VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J Practice-Cnininc.-1 Law-Appe<1I agaln~t aequi.rtal-App11eciat1}Jn of evidence by High Court-Approacli of Supre111e Court in JJurther- c.ppeal-Faclion cascs-Precau1io11s Qgailist i111plication of innocent persons. Jn dealing with appeals against acquittals the High Court has to bear in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of the a.ccused person and cannot Jose sight the fact that the said presumptiq-, is stfengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, and so. lhe fact that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt must alWilys be present in the mind of the High Court whe;r1 it deals with the merits of the case. But, how., ever circumspect and cautiol,ls the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with such appeals, it undoubtedly "is entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The observations in the various decish11ns prescribing a cautious approach, on the part o.f the High Court, in dealing with appeals against aequittals, do not cut down, limit or qualify its statutory power under s. 423(a) Cr.P.C., which is co-cxtens'ive with that under cl. (b). It is not necessary that the High Court must hold that the trial Court"s finding was perverse before reversing it. [581 A-D, F-H] This Court, on appeal from a judgment of convictio,n after setting aside an order of acquittal, would examine the ev'idence only for seeing that the High Court has' approached the question properly ~nd applied the principle~ correctly. Once it is found that the High Cou'rt has upplied correct principles in dealing with appeals against acquittals then this Court would not ordinarily go further into the evidence and weigh it for itself to substitute its owrr opin'ion for that of the High Court merely as to its sufficiency to suppOrt the conclusions arrived at by the · High Court. It wilt do so only if there is some serious, infirmity leading to grave injustice. In c;ise the High Court's judgment suggests that the correct principles were not kept in view then it would be open to. this Court to examine the entire evidence for t,hc purpose of assuring that justice does not fail [581 D-FJ In the p'resent case, in the judgment of the High Court there is trtO reference to the decisions of the Privy Council or of this Court laying down the principles which the appellate court is expected to keep 'in view when dea1ing with appeals against acquittal, but the judgment clearly shows that it \Vent into all the aspects on which fie prosecution evidence could be criticised and concluded that the evidence was fully trustworthy Olld that the medical evidence, though it might be shaky, did not throw onv doubt on the trustworthiness of the pfosecution witnesses as to the time, place, and circumstances in which . the deceased was killed. The appreciation of the evidence by the :m~h Court is unexceptionable and there is no questio.n of any poss1b1hty of a reasonable ooubt on the co'nclusions 11bout the time ahd place of occurrence and the n1anner in which the deceased met his death. [584 A-HJ 572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973) 3 S,C.R. But in cases like the pres~nt-, where there are party factions, there is a tendency to include the Innocent with the guilty and it is extremely difficult for the Court to guord against such a danger. The only real safeguard against the risk of condemning the itonocent with the guilty lies in insisting on acceptable evidence which in some measure impli- cates such acused and satisfies the conscience of the court. [585 0-HJ · In the instant case, the eye witi>esses have named all the appellants and the approver has even named those acquitted by the High Court. But it would be safe only to convict those who are stated to bav1> taken an active part and about whose identity there can be no reasonable doubt. :[,586 A-CJ Bhubaneshwar Manda! v. The State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 399, Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, I.L.R. 56 All. 645 (P.C.); Sanwatl Singh v. State of Rajasthan\ [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, State of U. P. v. Saman Dass, A.LR. 1972 S.C. 677, Khedu Mahton v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 66, Kanu Ambu Vish v.
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