BAINI PRASAD (D) THR. LRS. versus DURGA DEVI
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A B C D E F G H 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R. [2023] 3 S.C.R. 282 282 BAINI PRASAD (D) THR. LRS. v. DURGA DEVI (Civil Appeal Nos. 6182-6183 of 2009) FEBRUARY 02, 2023 [B. R. GAVAI AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.] Transfer of Property Act, 1882 : s. 51 β Protection under β Suit by the respondent for possession of the land by demolition of the structure put on by the appellant and for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the said land β Appellantβs case that two years ago he had carried out construction of the verandah in the land as part of his residential house bonfidely believing it to be his own land β Suit decreed in favour of the respondent β However, the first appellate court held that the respondent not entitled to the possession of the land after demolition of the structure put up based on the principles of acquiescence, however, entitled to compensation β High Court set aside the order of the first appellate court and restored that of the trial court β Review application there against also dismissed β On appeal, held: Appellant cannot be treated as a βtransfereeβ within the meaning and for the purpose of s. 51 β To attract s. 51, the occupant of the land must have held possession under the colour of title, and his possession must have been adverse to the title of the true owner β Concurrent findings of the courts below that the respondent is the owner of the land in question and the original appellants had encroached upon it and ignoring the absence of any title made structures thereon at his own risk β Thus, the appellants not entitled to rely on the provision u/s. 51 to seek for restoration of the modification made by the first appellate court with respect to demolition and possession β Being the party propounding the application of the principle of acquiescence it was the burden of the original appellant to establish the fact that the respondent had acquiesced in the infringement of his legal right and still stood by and allowed the construction β Furthermore, in the absence of any misrepresentation by an act or omission, the A B C D E F G H 283 mere fact that the respondent took some reasonable time to approach the court for recovery of possession cannot, be a reason to deny him the relief β No flaw, legal error, perversity or patent illegality found in the findings β Thus, the judgment of the first appellate court set aside and that of the trial court restored β Principle of acquiescence and estoppel β Evidence Act, 1872 β s. 115. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 The contention of the appellants founded on Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is totally misplaced and misconceived. This position would be revealed if ground βbβ raised in these appeals is juxtaposed to ground βdβ. Noticeably, the appellants assail the reversal of the modification of the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and attempting to sustain the modification based on contentions founded on the principle of estoppel and relying upon Section 51 of the TP Act. Conceptually, the underlying principles in Section 51, TP Act and the principle of estoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872 are converse and cannot co-exist. [Para 7][290-C-D] 1.2 The original appellant failed to establish that he is a βtransfereeβ within the meaning of the TP Act and for the purpose of Section 51, TP Act. In order to attract the Section the occupant of the land must have held possession under colour of title, his possession must not have been by mere possession of another but adverse to the title of the true owner and he must be under the bone fide belief that he has secured good title to the property in question and is the owner thereof. Section 51 gives only statutory recognition to the above three things. At the same time, in the case on hand, the concurrent findings of the courts below is that the respondent is the owner of the land in question and the original appellants had encroached upon it and effected construction. The appellants have failed to establish the above mentioned three things. The evidence on record would also go to show that even the construction was effected in deviation of the approved plan. [Para 10][292-C-E] 1.3 In the light of the concurrent findings on the questions of ownership and encroachment, it can only be held that it was BAINI PRASAD (D) THR. LRS. v. DURGA DEVI A B C D E F G H 284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R. after
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