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BAI CHANCHAL & ORS. versus SYED JALALUDDIN & ORS.

Citation: [1971] 2 S.C.R. 171 · Decided: 11-09-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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BAI CHANCHAL & ORS. 
v. 
SYED JALALUDDIN & ORS. 
September 11, 1970 
[J.C. SHAH AND V. 'BHARGAVA, JJ.] 
Bmnhay Rent Restriction Act (16 of 1939), s. 4(2)(b)-Lease of 
land.givi11R h'ssee right to build houses and let out--Wliether 'pren1h:es', 
Code of Civil Procedure Act (5 of 1908), 0. 12, r. 6, 0. 23, I'. 3-
l'a.\\inJ: 111ore than one decree in the stune szdt-Legality. 
The prcJcccssors in interest of th~ respondents, lcascJ certain land at 
an annual rent of Rs. 199, in l895 for 49 years. 
Tho lease was a per-
missivt! one and gave fight to the lc:;sccs to construct houses and let 
them out or to U'iC the lan<l in <iny n1anner. 
T;1c original lessees, durin~ 
the currer.cy of the lease made transfers of their rights arid also grJ11tcd 
sub-leases. 
A number of chav~1 Is and other buildings \\·i:rc 
co'1structr:.~t 
on t':e land and were Jct out. 
The "respondents terminated the lease and 
sued for recovery of possession in 1945. 
A compromise 
~:as entered 
into with th@, appellants, .who Y.:ere some of the occupants, and a consent 
decree was passed on 8th July 1946. Another consent decree was passed 
against the remaining defendants on 28th January 1949. 
Under the hrn 
decrees the defendants were allowed to remain in possession fo'r 5 year"> 
from the dates of the respective decrees and they 
had also to 
pav 
monthly mesne profits which worked out to more than Rs. 7.000 par 
annum, and that amount was so fixed that the mesne profits due for the 
5 years y.,·ere to be paid in 3 years. 
There was also a .clause that in case 
of default, the defaulting judgment-debtors could be immediately called 
upon to deliver possession. 
In 1953, the respondents sought possession 
by· executing the consent decree dated 8th July 1946. 
On the questions: (1) Whether the decree contravened the provi::-t•·", 
_,,f the .flombay Rent 
Restriction Act. 1939, as the 
leased land was 
'premises' within the meaning of s. 4(2)(b) of that Act; (2) whether 
the consent decree created a new tenancy which was protected by the 
Bombay .Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; and 
(3) whether the passing of two separate decrees was illegal as the court 
was not competent to do so. 
HELD: (I) 'Premises' is 
defined in s. 4(2}(b) as any land 
let 
separately for the purpose of being used principally for busin<"ss or trade. 
The words 'business or trade' do not comprehend a lease which is merely 
for constructing houses. 
Th~ terms of the lease, in the present case, do 
not establish that the lease was taken· principally for using the land for 
'business or trade.' [174 C-D; 175 G-Hl 
The mere fact that there was a mention in the pleadings that any 
structure that might have been erected would have to be removed, would 
in no way. lead to the conclusion that the principal purpose of. t~e lease 
was to build structures and that the structures should be utilised !or 
being let out on re"t and thus constitute business or trade. Therefor.e tl1e 
decree did not contravene the provisions of the Bombay Rent Restnct;on 
Act. T174 F-0; 115 D-E; 176 Al 
172 
SUPR:EME COURT REPORTS 
[1971]2 S.C.R. 
(2) On the face of it, all that the consent decree envisaged was that 
though the judgment-debtors were liable to immediate eviction, the decree 
holders aglreed to let them continue in possession for a period of 5 years, 
and. since the concession was granted as a special case, the decree~holders 
insisted on payment of mesn~ profits at a ~uch higher rate. :rhe terms 
of the consent decree could tn no way be interpreted as creating a new 
tenancy constituting the decree-holders as landlords and the judgment-
debtors as their tenants. [176 C-E, F-G] 
13) Order 23, r. 3 and 0. 12, r. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code en-
visage that in the same 01Jit there can· be more than one decree passed 
at different stages [177 D-F] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appeal No. 1460 of 
1969. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 
January 16, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in '.etters Patent 
Appeal No. 31 of 1966. 
S. T. Desai, M. H. Chhatrapati, P. N. Tiwari and 0. C. Mathur, 
for the appellants. 
D .. v. Patel and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3. 
R. H. Dhebar, B. Datta and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Uhar.gava, J. 
The predecessors-in-interest of plaintiff-respon-
dents 1 to 3 gave, in 1895, land, bearing Serial Nos. 503 and 506 
of Asarva wi

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