BACHAN SINGH S/O SAUDAGAR SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
~ 1193 BACHAN SINGH S/0 SAUDAGAR SINGH A v. STATE OF PUNJAB May 4, 1979 [R. S. SARKARIA AND P. S, KAILASAM, JJ.] Penal Code'-Death penalty-When can be imposed-Judges-If have ~ power to reduce sentence of death to one of life imprisonment-Raiendra .::-~Β·:Prasad's case-If a valid precedent. ... ... HELD : (Per Sark>1ria, J.) The records of this case be submitted to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench which would resolve the doubts, difficulties and inconsistencies pointed out by Kailasam J. in his order, particularly in its last paragraph. (Per Kailasam, J.) 1. Before the amendment of Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Pro- cedure by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1955 (Act 26 of 1955) was introduced, the normal sentence for an offence of murder was death and the lesser sentence was the exception. After the introduction of the amend- ment it was not obligatory for the court to state the reasons as to why the sentence of death was not passed. By the amendment the discretion of the court in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or imprisonment for life became wider. The court was bound to exercise its judicial discretion in awarding one or the other of the sentences. By the introduction of Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the normal sentence is the Jesser sentence of imprisonment for life and if the sentence of death is to be awarded, special reasons will have to be recorded. In other words, the court, before imposing a sentence of death, should be satisfied that the offence is of such a nature that the extreme penalty~ called for. [1203A-C] .-( 2. In a number of decisions, this court has reiterated the position that under section 354(3) of the 1973 Code, the court is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death special reasons are required to be stated. [1203D] Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab [1976] 2 S.C.R. 684; Ambaram v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1976] 4 S.C.C. 298; and Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1978] 1 S.C.R. 560 referred to. In Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. [1973] 2 S.C.R. 541 in which the constitu- ti@nal wlidity of imposition of death sentence was challenged, this Court held that the deprivation of life is constitutionally permissible if that is done accord- ing to the procedure established by law and that it cannot be held that capital sentence is per se unreasonable and not in the public interest. It was also held that the Judges are invested with very wide discretion in the matter of fixing Β·the degree of punishment and that discretion in the matter of sentence is liable 20-409SCij79 B c D E F G H A B c D E F G Jl 1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R. to be corrected by superior courts, that exercise of judicial discretion on well recognized principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. [1204C-D] .. 4. Section 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force ~ on April 1, 1974, after the judgment in Jagmohan Singh's case, provides that the judgment shall state the special reasons where a sentence of death is awacd- ..-b ed fo~ an o~enc: punishable with d'eath or in the alterna~ve with im.pruonment\., for life or tmpnsonment for a term of years. The reqmrement that courts~-.,.. should state the special reasons for awarding the death sentence would indi- cate that the normal sentence for an offence punishable either with death or with imprisonment for life is imprisonment for life and that if the court con- sidered that sentence of death is appropriate on the particular facts of the case it should give special reasons. [1204 G-H] 5. But in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916, the majority of a Division Bench of this Court held that "special reasons" neces- sary for imposing the death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the . criminal. The death sentence can be awarded only in certain restricted categories where a crime holds out a durable and continuing threat to social security in the setting of a developing country and poses a grave peril to soCiety's survival and when an economic offender intentionally mixes poison in drugs and knowingly and intentionally causes death for the sake of private profit and so on. The decision is in many respects contrary to the law laid down by the
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex