BACHAN SINGH ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1983] 1 S.C.R. 145 · Decided: 09-05-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 10 judgment(s) · cites 15 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

' 
BACHAN SINGH ETC. ETC • 
. v. l 
ST A TE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC. 
May 9, 1980/August 16, i982· 
[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P.N. BHAGWATI, R.S. SARKARIA, 
A.C. GUPTA AND N.L. UNTWALIA, JJ.] 
145 
(A} Death Penalty, whether' -constitutionally valid ?-Right to live, whether 
the provisions of section 302, Penal Code, offends Article 19 of the Constilution-' 
Distinctiop between "Public order" and "Law and Order''-Whether section 302, 
Penal Code, violates Article 21, the basic structure of the Constitution and Article 
6( I) of the lnternatlona_/ Covenant on Civil .and Political Rights as adoPted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations and reiterated in the Stockholm Declara-
tion. 
(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 354(3)-1/ section 302, 
Pertal Code, is constitution(ll, whether the sentencing procedure provided in sec- , 
lion 354(3) of the Code4 Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act Tl of 1974) is u~consti· 
tutional on the ground that it invests with unguided and untrainmelled discretion 
'and allows death sentence to he arbitrarily or freakishly imposed on a person fou~ · 
guilty of murder or any other capital offence punishable under the Indian Penal 
. Code with death. or, In the alternative with bnprisonment for life. 
(CJ Powers' of the Supreme Court to lay down standards or norms restrict-
ing the area of imposition of death perialty JO a narrow category of murders. 
Upholding the constitutionality of section 302, Penal Code, and section 
354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. the Court. 
HELD : Per majority. 
Sarkaria, J, 
[On 
behalf 
of Cbandracbud, C.J., 
AC. Gupta, 
N.L. Untwalia, JJ. and on his own behalf], 
The right to Jife is not one of the rights mentioned in Article 19 (J) of 
the Constitution and the six fundamental freedoms guarailteed under Article 19(1) 
are not absolute rights. The condition precedent for the applicability of Article 
19 is that the activity which the impugned law prohibits~and penalises, must be 
within the purview of and protectioµ of Article 19 (!). [173 E, 174 A, B·CJ 
A 
B 
C. 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Q 
146 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1983] l S.C.R. 
A 
State of Bombay.v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] SCR 874@ 920; 
B 
c 
[) 
Fatechand Himmatlal and Ors. v. State af Maharashtra, 
[1977] 2 SCR 828@ 
840 ; A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950] 1 SCR 88, followed. 
2. The Indian Penal Code, particularly those of its provisions which 
cannot be justified on the ground of unreasonableness with reference to any of the 
specified heads, such as "public order" in clauses (2), (3) and (4) is not a law 
imposing restrictions on any of the rights conferred by Article 19 (1). The_re are . 
several offences under the Penal Code, such as, theft, cheating, ordinary assault, 
which do not violate or affect "public order", but only "law and order". These 
offences injure only speci_tic individuals as distinguished from the public at large. 
It is now settled that "public order" means "even tempo of the life of the com· 
munity". That being so, even all murders do not disturb or affect "public 
order". Some murders may be of pure'ty privat~ significance and the injury or 
harm resulting therefrom affects only specific individuals, and, consequently. 
"such n1urders may not be covered by "public order" within the conten1plation of 
clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 19. Such Inutders do not lead tO public dis.order 
but to disorder simpliciter. Yet, no rational being can say that punishment of 
such murderers is not in the general public interest. It may· be noted that geJ?eral 
public interest is not specified as a head in clauses (2) to (4) on which restriction 
on the rights mentioned in clause (i) of the Article may be justified. 
-
,[181D.H,182 A-BJ 
The real-distinction between the areas of "law arid order" and "public 
order'' lies nofmerely in the nature or-quality of the act, but in the degree and 
ex.tent. Violent crimes similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and 
circumstances might cause different reactions. A murder committed in given 
E 
circumstances may caUse only a slight tremor, the wave length of which does 
not extend beyond the parameters of law and order. Another murder committed 
in different context and circumstances may unleash a tidal wave of such intensity~ 
'iravity and magnitude, that its i1npa<:t throws out of gear the even flow of life. 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that for such murders which do not affect •!_public 
order~', even t

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.