BABULAL VARDHARJI GURJAR versus VEER GURJAR ALUMINIUM INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. & ANR.
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A B C D E F G H 368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 13 S.C.R. [2020] 13 S.C.R. 368 BABULAL VARDHARJI GURJAR v. VEER GURJAR ALUMINIUM INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 6347 of 2019) AUGUST 14, 2020 [A.M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.7 and 238-A – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.18 and Art.137 – On or about 22.12.2007, the Lender Banks sanctioned and extended various loans, advances and facilities to the corporate debtor-respondent no.1 – The respondent no.1 defaulted in payment of the amount due against such loans, advances and facilities, its account was classified as Non-Performing Asset on 08.07.2011 – Recovery proceedings against the corporate debtor by the consortium of lenders u/s.19 of the Recovery of Debts due to the Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 before the DRT was started – On or about 21.03.2018, the respondent no.2, while stating its capacity as the financial creditor, for being the assignee of the loans and advances disbursed by the creditor Bank to the corporate debtor, filed an application u/ s.7 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority and sought initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in respect of respondent no.1 – The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) admitted the said application and initiated CIRP u/s.7 of the Code – Before the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), the appellant-the director of the respondent no.1 company contended that the claim was barred by time – However, the appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal – Aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal before the Supreme Court – The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for deciding the issue of limitation with respect to the application u/s.7 of the Code – The Appellate Tribunal held that the right to apply u/s. 7 of the Code accrued only on 01.12.2016 i.e. when the Code came into force and hence, the application filed by the Financial creditor in the year 2018 is not barred by limitation; and that the period of limitation is 12 years for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property, therefore, the claim is not barred by limitation – On appeal, held: The period of limitation for an 368 A B C D E F G H 369 application seeking initiation of CIRP u/s.7 of the Code is governed by Art.137 of the Limitation Act and is, therefore, three years from the date when right to apply accrues – In the instant case, the application made by the respondent no.2 u/s.7 of the Code in the month of March 2018, seeking initiation of CIRP in respect of the corporate debtor with specific assertion to the date of default as 08.07.2011 is clearly barred by limitation for having filed much later than the period of three years from the date of default as stated in the application – The NCLT had not even examined the question of limitation – Whereas, the NCLAT had decided the question of limitation on entirely irrelevant considerations – There is nothing in the Code to even remotely indicate if the period of limitation for the purpose of an application u/s.7 is to commence from the date of commencement of the Code itself – The NCLAT proceeded only on assumption, without any foundation and without any basis – Further, the reasoning of the NCLAT that property being mortgaged, the period of limitation is of twelve years is again erroneous and do not stand in conformity with the dictum of the Supreme Court – As in the B.K. Educational Service, it was held in no uncertain terms that the limitation provided in Art.137 governs the application u/s. 7 of the Code – Therefore, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside and the application filed by the respondent no.2 is rejected as being barred by limitation. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. When Section 238-A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is read with the consistent decisions of this Court in Innoventive Industries, B.K. Educational Services, Swiss Ribbons, K. Sashidhar, Jignesh Shah, Vashdeo R. Bhojwani, Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave and Sagar Sharma respectively, the following basics undoubtedly come to the fore: (a) that the Code is a beneficial legislation intended to put the corporate debtor back on its feet and is not a mere money recovery legislation; (b) that CIRP is not intended to be adversarial to the corporate debtor but is aimed at protecting the interests of the corporate debtor; (c) that intention of the Code is not to give a new lease of life to debts which are time-barred; (d) that
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