BABU SINGH AND ORS. versus THE STATE OF U.P.

Citation: [1978] 2 S.C.R. 777 · Decided: 31-01-1978 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER
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Judgment (excerpt)

r 
777 
BABU SINGH AND ORS. 
v. 
THE STATE OF U.P. 
January 31, 1978 
(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.) 
Bail-Grant of bail-Practice and Procedure in the matter of granting. of 
bail to an aci:used person pending the hearing of an appeal-Criteria for 
bail-Order XLVll Rule 6 r!w Order XX/ Rules 6 and 27 of Supreme Court 
Rules, 1966-Courts are not barred from second consideration at a later stage 
by e11tertaini11g another application for bail-Effect of interim directions by the 
Court. 
A 
B 
All the petitioners were charged with the offence of murder u/s 3Q2 l.P .. C.. 
C 
but all of them were acquitted by the Sessions Judge on 4-11-1972. The State 
sUcC'essfully appealed against the acquittal and by its judgment dated 20-5-1977 
the High Court, while reversing the findings of the Sessions Court, held all of 
them guilty and sentenced them all to life imprisonment. The 
petitioners 
came up to the Supreme Court exercising their statutory right of appeal. Pend· 
ing the disposal of the appeal, they moved an application for bail which was 
rejected on 7·9·1977. The petitioners moved another application for bail. 
Granting the bail, subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed, the Court 
HELD : 1. An order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily 
preclude another, on a Jater occasion, giving more materials, further develop· 
n1ents and different considerations. While it is a circumstance which the Courts 
surely must set store, Courts are not barred from second consideration at a 
later stage. An interim direction is not a conclusive adjudication and updated 
reconsideration is not overturning an earlier negation. 
[779 D--E] 
2. The significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the deprivation of liberty 
ephemeral or .enduring, a matter of grave concern and permissible only when 
the law authorising it is reasonable, even handed and geared to the goals of 
.community good and State·necessity spelt out Jin Article 19. Reag,onable· 
ness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by 
refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose, but for the bifocal interests of 
justice to the individual involved and society affected. f784 E·F] 
3. Personal liberty deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value 
D 
E 
of our constitutional system recognised under Art. 21. that the curial power to 
negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually, but judicially with 
lively 
cortcCrn for the cost to the individual and the community. Personal liberty of 
F 
an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms 
of procedure established by Jaw. The last four words of Art. 21 are the life 
of that human right. 
[781 A-Bl 
4. All deprivatio•n of liberty is validated by social defence 
and 
individual 
correction along an 
anti~criminal direction. Public justice is central to the 
whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive 
harshness should be minimised. Restorative devises to redeem the man, even 
through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources 
should be innovated and playing foul with public peace by tampering with 
evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offences while on 
judicially 
sanctioned "free enterprise" should be provided against. No seeker of justice 
shall play confidence tricks on the Court or community. Conditions may be 
hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic 
~jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion corre· 
lated to the va.lues of our Constitution. [785 B-C] 
5. The principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the pre· 
sence of the applicant, who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve 
sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
778 
· SUPREME 
COURT 
REPORTS 
[1978] 2 S·C·R· 
perspective relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus \Vith the likely 
absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence. 
[783 EJ 
·. The vital considerations are : (a) The nature of charge, the nature of the 
evidence and, the punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted, 
or conviction is confirmed. When the crime charged is of the highest magni-
tude and the punishment of it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Coun 
may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail 
would secure the presence of
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