LexB. SHAH versus PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE & ORS.
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' f 701 B. SHAH v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, COIMBATORE & ORS. October 12, 1977 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] Interpretation of social security legislation for women-Duty of the court. Right to payn1ent of maternity benefit~Connotation of the term "week" in sub. ss. (1) and (3) of s. 5 read with ss. 2(1), 3(n) and 4 of the Maternity Benefits Act (Act Lill of 1961). Whether computation of the maternity bene- fits prescribed by the Act has to be made taking a week as si1;11ifying a cycle of' seven days including a Sunday or a cycle of seven days minus a Sunday which A B is a wageless day-Paragraphs I and 2 of Art. 4 of Convention 103 of Maternity Protection Convention (Revisecf) 1952 adopted by the General Conference of the C International Labour Organisation. Respondent No. 2 working in "Mount Stuart Estate" belonging to the appel- lant was allowed leave of absence on maternity leave. After her delivery, the appellant paid her on account of maternity benefit an amount equivalent to what she would have earned on the basis of her average daily wages in 72 working days falling within 12 weeks of the maternity period excluding 12 Sundays being wageless holidays which fell during the period of the respondent's actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the D 6 weeks immediately following that day. The claifu for the benefit of the entire period of 12 weeks, that is, for 84 days on the plea that a week consisted of 7 days having been refused, the respo@ent moved the Labour Court, Coimba~ tore, which by its order dated February 26, 1969, allowed the said claim. The appe11ant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Labour Court. The single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition holding that 12 weeks for which maternity benefit is provided for in sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the Act must be taken to mean 12 weeks of work and the computation of the benefit had to be made with reference to the actual E days on which the woman would have worked but for her inability. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent filed an appeal under cl. 15· of the Letters Patent and the Division Bench set aside the orders of the single Judge. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, HELD: (1) In interpreting provisio11.s of beneficial pieces of legislation which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to woman workers employed in the plantations and which squarely fall within the purview of Article 42 of the Constitution, the beneficient rule of construction which would F enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court. [708 H, 709 A-Bl (2) The provisions of s. 5 of the Maternity Benefits Act make it clear that a woman \Vorker who expects a child is entitled to maternity benefit fOr a maxi- mum period of 12 weeks which is split up into two petiods viz., pre-natal and post-natal. The first one is the pre-natal or ante-natal period is limited to the G period of woman's actual absence extending upto 6 weeks immediately preced- ing and including the day on which her delivery occurs and the second one which is post-natal compulsory period consists of 6 weeks immediately following the day of delivery. The Act does not contain any deftnitiori of the word "week". It has to be understood in its ordina'ry dictionary me<lning. In the context of sub-s. (1) and (3) of s. 5 of the Act, the term has to be taken to signify a cycle of 7 days including Sundays. By using the words, namely, "for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day R of her delivery and for the 6 weeks immediately followin~ that day's. the Legislature intended that computation of maternity benefit is to be rnade for the entire period of the woman worker's actual absence, that is, for all the days including Sundays which may be wageless holidays falling within that 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 1 s.c:R. A period and not only for intermittent period of 6 da•ys thereby excluding Sundays falling within that period. The word "period" occurring ins. 5(1) of the Act --<. emphasises the continuous running of time and recurrence of 7 days. It i) also conforn1ity with Paragraphs
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