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B.K. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED versus PARAG GUPTA AND ASSOCIATES

Citation: [2018] 12 S.C.R. 794 · Decided: 11-10-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.F. NARIMAN

Cited by 24 judgment(s) · cites 8 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

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794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 12 S.C.R.
B. K. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED
v.
PARAG GUPTA AND ASSOCIATES
(Civil Appeal No. 23988 of 2017)
OCTOBER 11, 2018
[R. F. NARIMAN AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.238A (As inserted
by Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018
w.e.f. 06.06.2018) –  s.238A, if retrospective in nature – Held: s.238A
being clarificatory of law and being procedural in nature, must be
held to be retrospective – Amendment of s.238A would not serve its
object unless it is construed as being retrospective, as otherwise,
applications seeking to resurrect time-barred claims would have to
be allowed, not being governed by the law of limitation – Limitation
Act, 1963.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.238A (As inserted
by Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018
w.e.f. 06.06.2018) and ss.7 & 9 – Application for initiation of
‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’ – Whether Limitation Act,
1963 will apply to applications that are made u/s.7 and/or s.9 of
the Code on and from its commencement on 01.12.2016 – Held:
Since, Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed u/ss. 7 and
9 of the Code from the inception of the Code, Art.137 of the Limitation
Act gets attracted – “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a
default occurs – If the default has occurred over three years prior
to the date of filing of the application, the application would be
barred u/Art.137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those
cases where, in facts of the case, s.5 of the Limitation Act may be
applied to condone delay in filing such application – Limitation
Act, 1963 – Art.137 and s.5.
Remanding the appeals to NCLAT, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the present case, it is clear that the
amendment of Section 238A Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 would not serve its object unless it is construed as being
retrospective, as otherwise, applications seeking to resurrect
794
[2018] 12 S.C.R. 794
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795
time-barred claims would have to be allowed, not being governed
by the law of limitation.   [Para 15]  [815-D]
1.2  The Insolvency Law Committee Report of March, 2018
reflected that the legislature did not contemplate enabling a
creditor who has allowed the period of limitation to set in to allow
such delayed claims through the mechanism of the Code. The
Code cannot be triggered in the year 2017 for a debt which was
time-barred, say, in 1990, as that would lead to the absurd and
extreme consequence of the Code being triggered by a stale or
dead claim, leading to the drastic consequence of instant removal
of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor
permanently, and which may ultimately lead to liquidation and,
therefore, corporate death. This being the case, the expression
“debt due” in the definition sections of the Code would obviously
only refer to debts that are “due and payable” in law, i.e., the
debts that are not time-barred. [Para 21]  [821-D-F]
3.  It is clear that since the Limitation Act is applicable to
applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code from the
inception of the Code, Article 137 of the Limitation Act gets
attracted. “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default
occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the
date of filing of the application, the application would be barred
under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those
cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation
Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.
[Para 27]  [828-B-C]
M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE (2015) 7 SCC 58; Allied
Motors (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 3 SCC 472 : [1997]
2 SCR 780; Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination
Committee and Ors. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd.
and Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 468 – relied on.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai and
Ors. [1964] 6 SCR 261; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v.
ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017]
8 SCR 33; National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James
Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. [1953] SCR 1028; State of
Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1999) 3 SCC 657 : [1999]
B. K. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. v. PARAG GUPTA
AND ASSOCIATES
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 12 S.C.R.
2 SCR  372 ; Union of India v. Uttam Steels Ltd. (2015)
13 SCC 209 : [2015] 4 SCR 770; SBI v. V.
Ramakrishnan (2018) SCC Online SC 963; State of
Jharkhand v. Shivam Coke Industries (2011) 8 SCC
656 : [20

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