B!JAYA KUMAR AGARWALA ETC. versus STATE OF ORISSA
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B!JAYA KUMAR AGARWALA ETC. A v. STATE OF ORISSA AUGUST 1, 1996 [AM. AHMADI, C..J., AND SUJATA Y. MANOHAR, JJ.] B Esselltial Commodities Act, 1955 : Sections 3(2)(d) & 7--0rissa Rice and Paddy Control Orde1; 1965-Clauses 2(b) & 3-Deale1-Licence-Any person who 'stores' lice/paddy exceedi11g specified quantity deemed under Clause 3(2) to be a dealer a11d required under Clause 3(1) to act as such only under and in accordance with a licence-'Stores' and 'storage'--Meaning of-VVhere the cun1n1odity while in tra11sit falls 1vith the expressions-Held, n1ere transpolting the conunodity in tntcks in excess of the pennitted lbnit would not anzount c to stming within the meaning of Clause 3, but if the vehicle was also used for D sto1ing, the action would violate the Control Order-F1uther held, this was a question of fact to be decided in each case. lnte1pretatio11 of Statutes: Penal Statutes-Held, where two consl1uctions reasonably possible, one E which exenipts a person front penalty to be favoured. Words and Phrases: 'Stores' and 'storage'-Meaning of-In the context of Essential Commodities Act. The appellants were found travelling in trucks carrying paddy in F excess or the limit permissible under the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order. They were tried under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act as they bad no licence issued to them under the Control Order. They were convicted under and sentenced on the finding that their act amounted to 'storage' for which a valid licence was necessary. The conviction and the G sentence were confirmed in appeal. A revision was tiled before the High Court which was referred to the Division Bench, the point of reference being whether paddy loaded in a truck in excess of the permissible limit while in transit can be deemed to be 'stored' within the meaning of the expression 'storage' used in the Control Order. The Division Bench held that tranship- ment in a moving vehicle amounted to 'storage' and dismissed the revision H 249 250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A of the appellants. Hence this Appeal. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD: I.I. The dictionary meanings suggest that 'storing' has an element of continuity as the purpose is to keep the commodity in store and B retrieve it at some future date, even within a few days. If goods are kept or stocked in a warehouse, it can be immediately described as an act of 'storage'. A vehicle can also be used as a storehouse. But, whether in a particular case, a vehicle was used as a 'store' or whether a person had stored his merchandise in a vehicle would be a matter of fact in each case. c Carrying goods in a vehicle cannot per se be 'storing' although it may be quite possible that a vehicle is used as a store. Transporting is not storing. Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act uses the expression 'storage' and 'transport' as two separate acts which could be regulate by licences, permits or otherwise. The Order could as well prohibit transport- ing of large <1uantities of rice or paddy ";thin the sanction of Section 3 of D the Act. [255-G-H; 256-A-B] E F 1.2. The facts in a particular case must reveal that the vehicle was used not merely for transporting the goods but also for 'storing' as under- stood in the English language or even in common parlance. The mere fact that goods were found in a moving truck cannot prove that the goods were 'stored' in violation of the Order which makes such an act (when good.s stored were rice or paddy in excess of the limit) a penal offence. [256-B-C; 257-G] Balabhadra Raja Gu111 Mahapatra v. State, AIR (1954) Orissa 95, overruled. Prem Bahadur v. The State of Orissa, (1978) Crl. L J 683, approved. 2. In the instant case the appellants were merely found moving in trucks with paddy in excess of the quantity permitted to be 'stored'. Nothing G more was proved. That by itself cannot amount to 'storing' of goods and hence they cannot be said to have contravened any of the provisions of the Order. Therefore, they are not liable to be convicted or sentenced under Section 7 of the Act. [258-F-G] S.K. Amir v. Stale of Maharashtra, [1974] 3 SCR 84 and Swan/raj and H Others v. State of Maharashtra, [1974] 3 SCR 287, distinguished. - B.KAGARWALAv. STATE[AHMADI,J.] 251 3. Strict construction is the general rule of penal statutes. Keeping A in view the rules of interpretation of criminal statute and the language and intent
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