ASWINI KUMAR GHOSH AND ANOTHER versus ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 27-10-1952 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
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ASWINI KUMAR GHOSH AND ANOT]IER 
v. 
ARABINDA BOSE AND ANO'rHER 
[PATAN.JALI SASTHI O.J., MuKHElLTEA, DAs, 
VrvrAN BosE AND GHULA~r HASAN JJ.] 
Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, 
s. 2-Advocate of Supreme Court-Right to appear in Ori(Jinal Side 
of Calcutta High Court without attorney-"Practice", rneaning of-
Intei11retation of s. 2-Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, ss. 4(2), 
5(1), 8(1), 9( 4), 14-Calcutta H1:gh Court Orir1inal Side Hules, 
Chapter I, rr. 87, 88-Bombay High Court Original Side Rules, 
Chapter I, r. 40-1?1terpretatio11 of Stat·utes-Refere11ce to title, 
statement of objects, punctuation, speeches, original Bill. 
Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High 
Courts) Act, 1951, provided that "notwithstanding anything con-
tained ill the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXVIII of 1926), or 
any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person 
not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court may be per-
mitted to practise in that High Court every advocate of the 
Supreiµe Court shall be entitled as of right to practise in any 
High Court whether or not he is an advocate of that High Court": 
Held by the Coul't (PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., VIVIAN BOSE and 
GHULAM HASAN .JJ.-MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ. dissenti1ig).--
The practice of law in India generally involves the exercise 
of both the functions of acting and pleading on behalf of litigant 
parties, and when s. 2 of the abovesaid Act conferred upon an 
advocate of tbe Supreme Court tbe right to "practise" in any 
High Court, it is legitimate to understand that expression as , 
authorising him to appear and plead as well as to art on behalf of 
suitors in all the High Courts including tbe Original Side thereof. 
It is fallacious to relate that expression as applied to an advocate 
either, on the one hand, to the court in which the advocate is en-
rolled, pr, on the other, to the court in which he seeks to exercise 
the statutory right conferred 011 him. It must be related to the 
general constitution of tbe Bar in India as a single agency in deal-
ing with the litigant wblic. 
A rule made by a Hig!t Court which 
denies to an advocate the right to exercise an essential part of his . 
. function by insisting on a dual agency on the Original Side is much 
more than a rule of practice and constitutes a serious invasion of 
his statutory right to practise. and the power of making such a 
rule, unless expressly reserved (as it was reserved by the Bar 
Councils Act) would be repugnant to the right conferred bv s 2 · 
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and as the Act does not reserve any such power,_ the statutory 
right of a Supreme Court advocate under s. 2 to plead as well as 
ho act in the Hi~h Courts of Calcutta and Bombay in the exercise 
1952 
Oct. 27. 
• 
• 
• 
1952 
Aswini K untar 
Ghosh 
and A '~other 
v. 
Arabi1ida Bose 
and A Jiother. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1953] 
of their Original Jurisdiction cannot be taken away or curtailed 
by the rules of those courts, and any. rule which the Calcutta High 
Court may have made in the past purporting to exclude any .advocate 
from prat!tising on the Original Side or from appearing and pleading 
unless he is instructed by an attorney cannot affect such right. 
~IUIIBERJEA J .-The word 
11 practise" v.rhen used 
with 
reference to an advocate is an elastic expression having no rigid or 
fixed connotation and the precise ambit· of its contents can be as~ 
certained only by reference to the rules of the particular forum in 
which the profession is exercised. When s. 2 of the Supreme Court 
Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, speaks of a Supreme 
Court advocate being entitled as of 
right to practise in 
any High Court, \vhat it actually means is that he would be 
clothed hy reason of this statutory provision v•:ith all the rights 
which are enjoyed by an advocate of that court, and his right to 
plead and to act wouln depend on the Bar Councils Act and the 
rules validly framed by that court, subject to this that no rule or 
provision of la\v Y.lould be. binding \Vhich would affect in any way 
his statutory right to practise in that court solely, by reason of 
his heing enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court. 
DAS J .~The words "to practise", used in relation l=o la\vyers 
ft.S a class, mean "to ex0rcise their profession" \Vhicb is their 
dictionary n1eaning and \vhich is '\vide enough to cover the activi-
ties of the entire genus

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