ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS versus ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [2024] 5 S.C.R. 415 · Decided: 26-04-2024 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SANJIV KHANNA · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

* Authors
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 415 : 2024 INSC 341
Association For Democratic Reforms 
v. 
Election Commission of India and Another
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 434 of 2023)
26 April 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna* and Dipankar Datta,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Petitioners sought directions for re-introduction of the paper ballot 
system; or that the printed slip from the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit 
Trail (VVPAT) machine be given to the voter to verify, and put in 
the ballot box, for counting; and/or that there should be 100% 
counting of the VVPAT slips in addition to electronic counting by 
the control unit.
Headnotes
Elections – Electoral Process – Representation of the 
People Act, 1951 – Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – Use of 
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) – EVM-VVPAT mechanism 
– Writ petitions filed on the suspicion of the possibility of 
manipulation of the EVMs and mismatch in votes cast through 
EVMs – Directions sought for returning to the paper ballot 
system; or that the printed slip from the VVPAT machine be 
given to the voter to verify; and/or for 100% counting of the 
VVPAT paper trails in addition to electronic counting:
Held: Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself and Dipankar Datta, 
J.) EVM consists of three units, namely, the ballot unit, the control 
unit, and the VVPAT – EVM setup is designed in a rudimentary 
fashion and the EVM units are standalone and non-networked, i.e., 
they are unconnectable to any other third-party machine or input 
source – In case any unauthorised attempt is made to access the 
microcontroller or memory of the EVM, the Unauthorised Access 
Detection Mechanism disables it permanently – Advanced encryption 
techniques and strong mutual authentication or reception capability 
rules out the deciphering of communication between the EVM units 
and any unauthorised interaction with the EVM – The programme 
loaded in the EVM is key hashed and burnt into a One Time 
Programmable microcontroller chip at the time of manufacturing, 
thus dispelling any possibility of tampering – All the three units of 
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[2024] 5 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
the EVM have microcontrollers in which the respective firmware is 
burnt – The burnt programme/code is unalterable and cannot be 
modified after the EVM is delivered/supplied to Election Commission 
of India (ECI) – Every key press of the control unit is dynamically 
coded, making it impossible to decode the signal flowing among the 
units of the EVM inter se – Firmware of the control unit is agnostic 
to any candidate name or political party symbol – The possibility to 
hack or tamper with the agnostic firmware in the burnt memory to 
tutor/favour results is unfounded – The suspicion that EVMs can be 
manipulated for repeated or wrong recording of vote(s) to favour a 
particular candidate, rejected – ECI has conducted random VVPAT 
verification of 5 polling booths per assembly segment/constituency 
for 41,629 EVMs-VVPATs – More than 4 crore VVPAT slips have 
been tallied with the electronic counts of their control units – Not 
even a single case of mismatch (except one which arose on account 
of failure of the presiding officer to delete the mock poll data) or 
wrong recording of votes was detected – EVMs subjected to test by 
technical experts committee from time to time wherein no fault was 
found – The M3 EVMs currently in use are designed by engineers of 
BHEL and ECIL and vetted by the aforesaid committee – A number 
of safeguards and protocols with stringent checks have been put 
in place, as elucidated – Administrative and technical safeguards 
of the EVM reviewed in detail – Data and figures do not indicate 
artifice and deceit – Imagination and suppositions should not lead 
to hypothesize a wrong doing without any basis or facts – Credibility 
of the ECI and integrity of the electoral process earned over years 
cannot be over-ridden by contemplations and speculations – In N. 
Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India, the direction for counting the 
VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs per assembly constituency or assembly 
segment in a parliamentary constituency was issued to ensure the 
highest level of confidence in the accuracy of election results – 
Giving physical access to VVPAT slips to voters is problematic and 
impractical and will lead to misuse, malpractices and disputes – Not 
inclined to modify the directions to increase the number of VVPAT 
undergoing slip count – Data and the results do not indicate any 
need to increase the numb

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