ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. versus P. N. SHARMA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366 · Decided: 09-12-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 16 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. 
v. 
P. N. SHARMA AND ANOTHER 
December 9, 1964 
{P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH, 
S. M. SIKRI AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.) 
COflStilution of India, 1950, Art. 136(1)-Trlbunal-What 13-Faeto-
ries Act {63 of 1948), s. 49{1) and (2) and Punjab Welfare Ofjiceri R~ 
crultment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, rr. 6(3), Proviso 2{S) 
and (6)-Scope of-R. 6(3) Proviso 2, if invalid. 
Tho appellant appointed the ht reopondent as a Welfare Officer u 
required by the Factories Act, 1948 and the Punjab Welfare Officers llo-
cruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952. The letter of appoint-
ment stated that the !st respondent was liable to be transferred from one 
unit of the appellant to another and that his services could be terminated 
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by the appellant by one month'll notice or with one month's pay in lieu 
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thereof. 
On the ht respondent being unprepared to go to a place to 
which he was transferred, the appellant terminated his services with one 
month's salary. The !st respondent aj>pealed to the 2nd respondent, the 
State of Punjab, the appellate authonty under r. 6(6) and the 2nd res-
pondent ordered his re1DStatement as the previous concurrence of the 
Labour Commissioner as required by r. 6(3), proviso 2, was not obtained. 
In appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that : (i) the rule 
requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was invalid u 
it was outside the scope of the rule-malting authority conferred on the 
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State Government by s. 49(2) of the Act, and (ii) the order of reinstat&-
ment passed by the 2nd respondent was invalid as the appeal by the !st 
respondent to the 2nd respondent was incompetent. The !st respondent 
also raised a preliminary objection that the appeal to the Supreme Court 
was incompetent because the 2nd respondent was not a tribunal within the 
meaning of Art. 136{1) of the Constitution. 
HELD : (i) The 2nd respondent is a tribunal within the meaning ot r 
Art. 136( I) having regard to the distinctive features of the power conf•-
red on it by r. 6(5) and (6). (387 BJ 
(Per Gajendragadkar, C. J., M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah and S. M. 
Sikri, JI.) : In considering the questipn about the status of any body or 
authority as a tribunal under the article, the consideration about tho 
presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. 
The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of 
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the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which 
possessed the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. 
The _main and basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which 
a particular authority is empowered to exercise, bas been conferred on it 
by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power 
exercised in discharging its judicial function. 
Applying the test, there 
can be no doubt that the power which the 2nd respondent exercised under 
rr. 6(5) and (6) of the Rules is a part of the State's judicial power. It 
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bas been conferred on the 2nd respondent by a statutory rule 8J!d it can 
be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its welfare 
officers. There is a li.r an affirmation by one party and denial by another, 
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A.c.c. LTD. 11. P. N. SHAllMA (Gajendragadkar, C./.) 
367 
and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the 
parties to it. 
The order which the 2nd respondent ultimately passes is 
described as its decision and it is made final and binding. Besides, it is an 
order passed on appeal. In reaching a fair and objective decision in the 
dispute brought before it iii its appellate jurisdiction, the State Government 
has the power to devise its own procedure and to exercise such other 
incidental and subsidiary powers as may be necessary to deal effectively 
with the dispute. [386 F-H; 387 A-B, E] 
Per Bachawat, 1. The basic test of a tribunal within the meaning of 
Art. 136, is that it is an adjudicating authority (other than a coun) vested 
with the judicial power of the State. 
In India, the State has inherent 
judicial powers or functions and the courts and other authorities vested 
by the State with judicial functions are regarded as delegates of the State 
judicial power. The courts alone have no monopoly of the judicial power. 
An authority other than a coun vested with the judicial power of the 
State in this sense is regarde

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