ASSIT. COLLECTOR OF ESTATE DUTY MADRAS versus SMT. V. DEVAKI AMMAL, MADRAS

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 573 · Decided: 17-11-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.P. BHARUCHA · Disposal: Disposed off

Judgment (excerpt)

ASSIT. COLLECTOR OF ESTA TE DUTY MADRAS 
V. 
SMT. V. DEV AKI AMMAL, MADRAS 
NOVEMBER 17, 1994 
[S.P. BHARUCl-IA, S.C. SEN AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.] 
Estate Duty Act, 1953-Section 34(/) (c)-Constitutional validity of-
No discrimination brought about by Section 34(/)(c) between members of a 
Mitalcshara Joint Hindu family and of a Dayabhaga family-Provision is 
not violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. 
Constitution of India-Article 14-Estate Duty Act, 1953-Section 
34(/)(c)-Constitutional validity of-No discrimination brought about by 
Section 34(/)(c) between members of a Mitakshara Joint Family and of a 
Dayabhagafamily-Provision is not violative of Article 14. 
A 
B 
c 
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE-One Division Bench of a High Court should, D 
ordinarily, follow judgment of another Division Bench of that High Court-
Where latter Division Bench finds it difficult to follow earlier Bench 
judgment-Papers be placed before Chief Justice of High Court to 
constitute larger Bench-Where one Division Bench held a statutory 
provision to be constitutional-Another Division Bench not to hold same E 
provision unconstitutional-Practice and Procedure. 
In Pl. S. RM. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Asstt. Controller of Estate Duty, 
(76) ITR 402, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, upon a writ 
petition, held that section 34(l)(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, was not 
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was held that F 
there was no discrimination brought a·bout by·section 34 (l)(c) between 
the members of a Mitakshara Joint Hindu family and the members of a 
Dayabhaga family. Another Division Bench of the Madras High Court 
in, V. Devaki Ammal v. Asstt. Controller of Estate Duty, (91) ITR 24, held 
section 34(l)(c) to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution. The latter Division Bench noted the judgment of the G 
earlier Division Bench. This judgment of the Madras High Court was 
challenged before this Ccurt. 
The appellants submitted that section 34(l)(c) was not violative of 
Article 14. The accountable person alleged that by reason of section 34, 
unequals were treated equaUy. Estates falling under clauses (a) and (b) H 
573 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
574 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R 
of section 34(1) related to property that had actually passed whereas 
clause (c) related to property which did not pass but, by reason of the 
deeming provisions of section 7, was deemed to pass. It was submitted 
that estates falling under clauses (a) and (b) were not equal to the 
estates falling under clause (c) but the latter estates were similarly 
treated in that aggregation in the manner specified u/s 34 was required 
to be made in regard to all of them. It was also submitted that when 
Dayabhaga father died his son got a share in his estate only on death 
whereas in a Mitakshara Joint Hindu family a son got a right to the 
property thereof at birth. Neither the father nor the son had any 
defined share in a Joint Hindu family property governed by 
Mitakshara law and yet those governed by Mitakshara law were sought 
to be equated with those covered by Dayabhaga law on death. 
Disposing of the matter, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. In the case of a member of Dayabhaga family dying, 
no question of aggregation can arise at all for the member of such a 
family dying possessed by reason of his personal law a defined share in 
the assets of the family, unlike a deceased member belonging to a Joint 
Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law dying. The principle of 
aggregation has been embodied in section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty 
Act, 1953. But for the principle of aggregation, the rate applicable to 
'!uch a case will be the rate corresponding to the value of the benefit 
that can be regarded as having ·accrued to each of the lineal 
descendants of the deceased. Whereas, in the case ofDayabhaga family, 
in view of the fact that the share of the deceased member is a 
crystallised one, the rate applicable in that case would be a rate 
corresponding to ·the value of the share of the deceased member. 
Therefore, but for the principle of aggregation envisaged by section 
34(1)(c), there would be discrimination. In fact, section "34(1)(c) avoids 
such a discrimination. (580 E-G) 
1.2. There is no discrimination whatever brought about by .Section 
34 (1) (c) between members of a Mitakshara Joint Hindu family and of 
a Dayabhaga ,family in the matter of application of rates of taxation. 
(5

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