ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INSPECTION INVESTIGATION versus KUM. A.B. SHANTHI
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A ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INSPECTION INVESTIGATION v. KUM. A.B. SHANTHI MAY 3, 2002 B [RP. SETHI AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] Income Tax Act, I 96 I: Sections 269 SS and 27 I D-Prescribed mode of taking or accepting C loan and penalty in violation thereof-Ascertained in respect of borrower and not the /ender-Whether discriminatory-Held provisions are not discriminatory, draconian or exproprietory-Hence constitutionally valid- Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14. D Section 269 SS-Enactment of under entry 82 in List I of Seventh Schedule-Legislative competence challenged-Plea that enactment is on the subject outside scope of Income Tax Act-Held, since law relating to tax can be enacted under Schedule 7, List I, Entry 82, it is within ihe competence of Parliament and the same is not co/ourable legislation-Enactment of any ancillary or subsidiary provision which transgresses over jurisdiction of E legislature for achieving the object of such legislation, would be a valid piece of legislation-Doctrine of colourable legislation. F Judicial Review-Tax legislation-Held, it is a policy decision and hence it is for Parliament to decide in which manner legislation should be made-Hence no judicial interference called for. Interpretation of Constitution-VII Schedule-Legislative list-Entries- Interpretation of-Held, entries should be given their fullest meaning and widest amplitude and to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters. High Court quashed prosecution against the respondent holding Section G 269 SS of Income Tax Act, 1961 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. H In connected appeal, wherein constitutional validity of Sections 269 SS and 271 D of the Act was challenged before High Court, the matter was dismissed by Single Judge as well as Division Bench. 764 J - _,.,. - ' .. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INSPECTION INVESTIGATION v. A.B. SHANTHI 765 In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the policy behind A enactment of Secti_on 269 SS debarring and penalising the borrower and not the lender is illegal and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution vis-a-viz. the lender; and if the intention of legislature was to unearth black money it was really black money of the lender that was involved in the transaction, and thus the classification was artificial and had no nexus with objects sought to B be achieved by the enactment; that Parliament had no legislative competence to enact Section 269 SS, the source of which was traceable to entry 82 in List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which relates only to tax on income other than agricultural income and expression 'income' in the Entry has to be interpreted according to its natural and grammatical meaning and the amount received may necessarily be not the income and hence treating the loan as C income is not a valid constitutional legislation; and that Section 276 DD and 271 D was unconstitutional, the same being draconion and exproprietory in nature. Allowing the appeal of the Revenue and dismissing the connected appeal of the assessee, the Court D HELD: 1. Section 269 SS is, in any way, not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently quashing of the proceedings by the Single Judge of High Court is not legally sustainable. The object of introducing Section 269 SS is to ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false E explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizures, unaccounted money is unearthed and the tax payer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends and it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the tax-payer. The main object F of Section 269 SS was to curb this menace. As regards the tax legislations, it is a policy matter, and it is for the Parliament to decide in which manner the legislation should be made. Of course, it should stand the test of constitutional validity. (771-G; 772-A; 770-D, E( S.K. Dutta, ITO v. Lawrence Singh lngty, 68 (1968) ITR 272; K.R.M V G Ponnuswamy NadarSons v. Union of India, 196 (1992) ITR 431 (Madras) and Sukhdev Rathi v. Union of India, 211 (1995) ITR 157 (Guj.), relied on. 2.1. Section 269 SS was not enacted without legislative competence. It cannot be said that Section 26
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