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ASSAM SILLIMANITE LTD. AND ANR. versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] 1 S.C.R. 983 · Decided: 16-03-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. RANGANATHAN · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

ASSAM SILLIMANITE LTD. AND ANR. 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
MARCH 16, 1990 
[S. RANGANATHAN AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] 
.lf' 
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1951: 
Section 4A-Termination of mining /ease-Necessity for giving of 
opportunity to holder. 
The petitioner company had obtained three mining leases from 
the Government of Assam to extract sillimanite in the Khasi and Jaintia 
Hills District, for a period of 15 years. 
A 
B 
Negotiations between the Union of India and the petitioner for 
having the mining leases transferred to the public sector companies, 
Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Bokaro Steel Ltd., having failed, the Govern- . D 
ment of Meghalaya, on the request of the Central Government, passed an 
order dated 7th December, 1972 prematurely terminating the mining 
leases in terms of section 4-A( 1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation 
& Development) Act, 1957 as amended by the Mines & Minerals (Regu-
lation and ,Development) Amendment Act, 1972. Thereupon, the 
petitioner company filed the present petition under Article 32 of the 
E 
Constitution. 
On behalf of the petitioner it was inter alia contended that since no 
notice had been issued by the State Government before terminating the 
leases prematurely, it amounted to denial of natural justice thus vitiat-
ing the order of termination. 
F 
State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan. & Ors., [1988] 3 S.C.C. 416, 
relied upon. 
It was further submitted that having regard to the comparatively 
long periods of leases and the lapse of time, the petitioner would not 
G 
pray for being put back in possession of the leased premises but would 
be content with an award for compensation for wrongful premature 
termination, to be determined by any arbitrator appointed by the 
Court. 
On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the decision of 
H 
983 
A 
984 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] I S.C.R. 
this Court in Ram Kishan's case was distinguishable; that the rules of 
natural justice could be statutorily excluded either expressly or by 
necessary implication; that grant of an opportunity to the lessee would 
be totally meaningless and futile; that the object and purpose of the 
statute clearly excluded the provision of an opportunity to the lessee 
before termination of the leases; that amendment of section 4-A of 1986 
specifically providing for an opportunity of bearing became necessary 
because the grounds for premature termination set out in the new sub-
section (1) of section 4-A were made wider and more comprehensive; 
that in the writ petition the only prayer made was for quashing the 
order of premature termination; and that it was open to the petitioner 
to file a suit or take other appropriate remedies for obtaining compen-
sation in respect of the unlawful termination. 
The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. Company Law Board 
'fยท 
and Others, [1966] Suppl. S.C.R. 311 and R.S. Dass v. Union of India 
-"" 
and Others, [1985] Supp. S.C.C. 617, referred to. 
D 
Disposing of the writ petition, this Court, 
p 
q 
HELD: (1) The order dated 7.12.1972 passed under section 4A of 
the Act whereby the leases were terminated prematurely was null and 
).._ 
void as it violated the principles of natural justice and was passed 
without giving an opportunity to the lessee of being heard. 
State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan & Ors., [1988] 3 SCC 416, 
followed. 
Dharam Veer v. Union of India, AIR (1989) Delhi 227, referred 
to. 
(2) Though it is true that the scope of section 4-A (1) has been 
widened, the insertion of sub-section 4-A(3) clearly reflects a statutory 
intention that an opportunity of hearing must be given before the order 
of termination is passed, presumably as such an order widely effects the 
rights of the lessees. [992A] 
(3) It is difficult to accept the contention that because an order 
under section 4-A is to be passed in order to give effect to a policy of the 
Government, it is not necessary or useful to provide the lessees, whose 
leases are about to be terminated, an opportunity of hearing. [992D J 
Ii 
( 4) It is true that the petitioner could have r.Jed a suit or taken 
ASSAM SILLIMANITE v. U.0.1. IRANGANATHAN, J.] 
985 
other appropriate remedies for obtaining compensation in respect of the 
unlawful termination. But, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it 
is not fair to ask the petitioner to go back and tile a suit for compensa-
tion or damages which may be barred. by limitation. The writ P.,tition 
was filed by the pet

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