ASHOK SINGH versus ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, CALCUTTA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1992] 3 S.C.R. 190 · Decided: 12-05-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. MOHAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
ASHOK SINGH 
y 
v. 
ASSISTANJ.: CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, 
CALCUT'I'A AND OTHERS. 
B 
MAY 12, 1992 
[S. MOHAN AND G.N. RAY, JJ.] 
Estate Duty Act, 1953: 
c 
Sections 53-A, 56(2), 58, 59 and 73A-Estate Duty-Levy of-Proceed-
ings not commenced within five years from the death of estate owner-Ap-
plication for grant of succession certificate made by the deceased's son after 
attaining majority-Whether proceedings debtm"ed-Whether succession cer-
-----< 
tificate could be denied on ground of non-production of certificate from 
D Controller-"Proceedings for the levy of any duty"--whether includes proceed-
ings for assessment. 
Interpretation of Statues-Plain meaning to be given effect to. 
Words and Phrases-Word 'levy'-Meaning of 
E 
Legal Maxims-Quai Haeret in Litera Haeret in Cortice. 
The appellant's father died intestate leaving behind the appellant 
and his brother. Since they were minors at that time their maternal uncle 
F 
was appointed as guardian by the City Civil Court. The guardian never 
filed the account of the property or the return as required under Sections 
53 or 56 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 in respect of the estate of the 
A_ 
appellant's father within five years from the date of his death. 
~ 
On attaining majority, the appellant as Karta, applied to the City 
G Civil Court for the grant of a succession certificate in respect of the estate 
of his father. However, during the proceedings, it was· pointed out that a 
certificate from Estate Duty Authority was necessary under Section 56(2) 
,,.., 
of the Act. 
On behalf of the appellant it was urged that in view of Section 73A 
H of the Act, the time to commence any proceedings for levy of estate duty 
" 
190 
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ASHOK SINGH v. ASSIT. CONTROLLER 
191 
had become barred inasmuch as five years had expired from the date of A. 
the death of his father. Hence, the question of production of certificate 
under Section 56(2) did not arise. 
The Chief Judge of the City Civil Court held that he could not go 
into this question since the authorities constituted under the Act alone 
could decide this. 
H 
Thereafter, the appellant filed the return with the Assistant Control-
ler of Estate Duty. The appellant was sened with a notice under Section 
58(2), along with a questionnaire with the first respondent-the Assistant 
Controller of Estate Duty. Despite the appellant's objection that no C 
proceedings could be initiated in view of the statutory bar under Section 
73~ inasmuch as the period of five years had expired form the date of his 
father's death, the appellant was called upon to furnish certain par-
ticulars. Under these circumstances the appellant challenged before the 
High Court the notice issued under Section 58(2) of the Act, along with 
the questionnaire and the proceedings. A Single Judge cancelled the notice D 
in question. 
On appeal by the first respondent, the Division Bench held that 
Section 73A did not do away with the liability of an accountable person for 
payment of duty; it only barred the initiation of proceedings for levy of E 
duty. Therefore, if the liability remained but proceedings could not be 
initiated, there was no question of full payment of duty. As such it could 
not be stated in the certificate by the Controller that there was no claiin 
of estate duty from accountable person; and, accordingly, the bar of 
limitation was not applicable to cases as provided under Section 73A where 
application was made for grant of representation or succession certificate F 
and the account or the copy application was delivered to the Controller as 
required under Section 56. 
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant it was 
contended that the construction placed by the Division Bench was totally 
incorrect; Section 73A was comprehensive in its scope in so far it threw a G 
statutory bar preventing the authority from commencing any proceeding 
after th" expiry of nve years; and would take within It Section !6 also; ~hat 
the High Court was not correct In Its view that no grant of representation 
of succession certificate could be made after the expiry or nve years; that 
Section 56 would have to be so read as to bring about a harmonlous H 
192 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1992) 3 S.C.R. 
A 
construction between Section 73A and Section 56; and that strict literal 
interpretation would defeat the object and purpose of the statutory bar 
under Section 73A. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court, 
B 
HELD : 1.1 The language of Section 

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