ASHOK KAPIL versus SANA ULLAH (DEAD) AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 768 · Decided: 25-09-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KULDIP SINGH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
ASHOK KAPJL 
v. 
SANA ULLAH (DEAD) AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 25, 1996 
[KULDIP SINGH AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.J 
Rent control and Evir~tion-U.P. Urban B1tildings (Regulation of Let-
ting, rent and Eviction) Act 1972-Sections 3 and 16-Building-Allot-
ment~bjected by the landlor~Since roofless structure not to be considered 
C as a building-Held, concwTent finding of the fact that stntcture was a roofed 
building when it fell vacmzt and the roof of the building was p1tlled down by 
the landlord subsequently, thereby rendeling it a roofless stntcture- A building, 
even after losing the roof can cQntinue to be a building in its general mean-
ing-Taking recourse to such general meaning in the present context would 
D help to prevent a mischief-Liberal inte1pretation of law fr necesswy to prevent 
a wrong doer from taking advantage of his own wrong. 
MAXIMS 
"Nullus Commodum Capere Potest de Injuria Sua Prop1ia" (No man 
E can take advantage of his own wrong~ne of salient tenets of equity-Held, 
Respondent cannot secure the assistance of a co wt of law for enjoying the 
fmit of his own wrong: 
F 
G 
Sana Ullah, the father of contesting respondents was the landlord of 
the suit premises. D was the tenant and on the expiry of his tenancy, the 
appellant applied to the District Magistrate for allotment of suit premises 
in his name. The landlord raised objections that the structure was not a 
"building" as it had no roof then. But his objections were rejected and the 
District Magistrate found that the structure was still a building and 
passed an order of allotment in the name of the appellant. 
On a revision· petition to the District Judge, the case was remanded 
back to the District Magistrate for arriving at certain findings on facts. 
Finally it was found that the building was a roofed structure when D 
vacated it, but subsequently its tin roofs were dismantled by the owner of 
the building and the structure remained roofless even on the date of 
H allotment order. The District Magistrate passed an allotment order and 
768 
ASH OK KAPIL v. SANA ULLAH 
769 
the appellant occupied the building. 
In the revision, the District Judge confirmed the allotment order 
holding that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to allot such a 
structure. 
A 
A writ petition filed in the High court by the landlord was allowed B 
and the allotment order was quashed. The High Court was of the opinion 
that the legislature did not confer power of allotment in respect of a 
construction which ceased to be a building at the time of allotment and 
hence the order of allotment made in favour of appellant was set aside. 
The High Court took the view that an order of allotment under section 16 C 
of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 
1972 can be made only in respect of a building and not with respect to a 
construction which was a building at the time when it was vacated but 
subsequently ceased to the so. Hence this appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. It is clear from the definition of 'Building' under section 
3(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) 
Act 1972, that any structure without roof cannot fall within the ambit of 
D 
the definition. The factual position is that the structure remained a roofed E 
building when it became vacant but the roof was later dismantled by the 
owner. So as on the date of allotment order it remained roofless. If the 
crucial date is the date of allotment order, the structure was not a building 
as defined in the Act. But, the respondent cannot be assisted by a court of 
law to take advantage of the mischief committed by him. The maxim, 
"Nullus Commodum Capere Potest de injuriea sua propria" (No man can take F 
advantage of his own wrong) is one of the salient tenets of equity. Hence, 
in the normal course, respondent cannot secure the assistance of a court 
of law for enjoying the fruit of his own wrong. [772-F -HJ 
1.2. Jurisdiction of the District Magistrate is in respect of a building G 
which is either vacant or which "has fallen vacant" or is about to fall vacant 
as per Section 16(1), If a structure was a building as per the definition at 
the time when it fell vacant, the D~strict Magistrate, no doubt, gets juris-
diction to initiated proceedings for passing allotment order. [773-F] 
2.1. If the District Magistrate has commenced exercising jurisdiction H 
770 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 
A ulider Section 16 o

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