ARVIND MOHAN SINHA versus AMULYA KUMAR BISWAS & ORS.

Citation: [1974] 3 S.C.R. 133 · Decided: 17-01-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.N. DWIVEDI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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133 
ARVIND MOHAN SINHA 
1'. 
AMULYA KUMAR BISWAS & ORS. 
January 17, 1974 
[S. N. DWIVEDI AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] 
Probation of o.f(enders Act, 20of1958-Whetiier applies to offe11ces 1u1der Customs 
Act, 1962, and offences under Part XII-A. Defence of India Rules, 1962. 
· 
Defence of India Rules, 1962, r. 1261 and J26P-'Gold' if Includes smuggled gold. 
On the question (1) whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, app1ies to 
offences under Customs Act, 1962, and to those under Part XU-A of the Defence 
of India Rules, 1962, relating to Gold Control, and (2) \Vhether under the scheme of 
the Gold Control Rules, smuggled gold is not comprehended under r. 126p. 
HELD: (1) These a~c n1ostly ·economic offences which in conceivable cases, 
may pose a grave threat to the economy and the security of the country. They 
arc fundamentally of a different genre and are calculated to involve consequences 
of a far reaching character as compared with the offences under the general law of 
crimes. But every contravention of the Customs Act or the Gold Control Rules 
cannot, without more, t.e assumed to be fraught with consequences of national 
dimensions. The words of s. 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act are wide and 
would include even offences under the Custo1ns ACt and the Gold Control Rules. 
Though r.126p(2) (ii) of the Defence of India Rules prescribes a n1inimum sentence 
of 6 n1onths, it cannot override the provision"S of the Probation of Offenders A.ct. 
[136G] 
(a) The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative mensure ::?.nd its object 
is to reclaim ainateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can 
be usefully rehabilitated in society. A jai1 terin would normally be enough to wipe 
out the stain of guilt but the sentence which society passes on convkts is rele11tless. 
ln recalcitrant cases punislunent bas to be deterrent so that others similarly minded 
l'nay warn thcn1selves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice,. 
~s in the present case, \vho strays into the path or crin1e ought, in the interest of 
society, to be treated as being socially sick. The ignon1iny con1monly associated 
with a jail tcnn and the social stigma which attaches to convicts often render the 
remedy worse than the disease. Crhnes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies 
and their origin n1ay lie in psychological factors induced by hunger. \Vant and poverty. 
The Act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission 
of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and 
rehabilitated in society. An attitude of social 1.kfiance and recklessness which comes 
to a convict who, after a jail ter1n, is apt to think that he has nothing n1ore to lose or 
fear, may breed a litter of crime. The object of the Act is to nip that attitude io the 
bud. 
[137A] 
Rata11 lal v. State of Punjab, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 676 and l:slter Dat v. Tlze State of Punjab, 
A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 1295, followed. 
(b) There is no foundation for the fcilr that offenders released on probation n1ay 
hold the society to ransom and that society n1ay therefore look upon the release 
of offenders on probation as the triumph of criminals over the \veaknesses of law. 
An offender released on probation is convicted but not forthwith. sentenced in the 
sense of penal laws. Section 4(1) of the Act pro\'ides that instead of sentencing the 
offender "at once" the court may direct his release· on his entering into a bond to 
receive a sentence when called upoQ. during the probationary period and in the mean 
time to keep the-peace and be of good beba\'iour. Thus it is only in a limited sense, 
though a socially significant. sense. that the Act constitutes an exception to the 
broaa and general principle of criminal law that a sentence shall follow on conviction. 
The discretion vested in the trial court in thi~ behalf must of course be e:terciscr.l 
~1ccording to rules of reason and justice depending on the circumstances of each case. 
but the Magistrate had called for the report of the Probation Officer and it was 
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SUPREME COUllT REPORTS 
[ 19741 3 s.c.~. 
on the basis of that roport that the respondents were released on probation and the 
Hi,gb Court has upheld the exercise of that discretion. There is no reason to interfere 
with the concurreni factual evaluation of the ci=mstances of the case. (137GJ 
Jal Narain\', Tiie Municipal Corporation of Delhi, A.l.R. 1972 S.C. 26

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