LexARUN RAJ versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
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[2010] 7 S.C.R. 1 ARUN RAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 1123 of 2008) MAY 13, 2010 [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.) Penal Code, 1860/Army Act, 1950: A B s. 302 and s. 69 of Army Act - Court Martial proceeding c - For trial of offence of murder - Eye-witness to the incident - Dying declaration made to another witness - Offence alleged to be result of an incident occurring a day prior to the incident - General Court Martial finding the accused guilty of the offence - Sentenced to life imprisonment and dismissal 0 from service - Conviction ano sentence confirmed by Confirming Authority, Chief of Army Staff and in writ petition by High Court - On appeal, plea that offence falls under Exception I to s. 300 /PC and since the accused caused single stab injury, he was liable to be punished uls. 304 (Part II) - Held: Conviction u/s. 302 justified - Evidence of the case E makes it clear that s. 304 (Part II) not attracted - The case does not fall under Exception I to s.300 - Once intention to cause death is proved, infliction of single or multiple blows becomes irrelevant. _ Penal Code, 1860: s. 300 Exception I - Applicability of - Discussed. s. 304 (Part II) - Applicability of - Discussed. Doctrines: .... r G 'Doctrine of provocation' - Meaning and applicability of Appellant-accused, an army official was charged for 1 H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A having caused death of one of his colleagues (deceased). Court Martial proceedings were initiated against him u/s. 302 IPC r/w Section 69 of Army Act, 1950. According to prosecution on the day of the incident 8 the accused made complaint to his superior officer that the deceased and PW3 had abused him. After making the complaint, he came to the barrack with a kitchen knife concealed in his 'fungi' and stabbed the deceased on the right side of his chest, while he was sleeping in the barrack on a cot. PW-1 was the eye-witness to the C incident. General Court Martial found the appellant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to 7 years RI and dismissed him from service for the offence punishable u/ s. 69 of Army Act r/w. 302 IPC. On revision, Confirming Authority held that once appellant is found guilty of the D offence of murder, he could be either sentenced to life imprisonment or death sentence. General Court Martial, accordingly, revising the sentence, sentenced him to life imprisonment and dismissal from service. The same was confirmed by the Confirming Authority. A petition against E the same to the Chief of Army Staff u/s. 164 of Army Act was rejected. Appellant-accused filed a writ petition contending that charge framed was vague and that facts of the case F did not justify punishment of life imprisonment as the accused can be punished at the most u/s. 304 (Part-II) and not u/s. 302 IPC. High Court dismissed the writ petition. Hence the present appeal. G Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is not bad in law. Under Exception I to Section 300 IPC, an injury resulting into death of the person would not be considered as murder H when the offender has lost his self-control due to the ARUN RAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 3 grave and sudden provocation. The provision itself A makes it clear by the Explanation provided, that what would constitute grave and sudden provocation, which would be enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder, is a question of fact. Provocation is an external stimulus which can result into loss of self-control. Such B provocation and the resulting reaction need to be measured from the surrounding circumstances. Here the provocation must be such as will upset not merely a hasty, hot tempered and hypersensitive person but also a person with calm nature and ordinary sense. What i!:1 c sought by the law by creating the exception is that to take into consideration situations wherein a person with normal behavior reacting to the given incidence of provocation. Thus, the protection extended by the exception is to the normal person acting normally in the 0 given situation. [Paras 6 and 16] (20-C; 11-H; 12-A-D] Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecution (1942) A.C. 200; Rex v. Lesbini (1914) 3 K.B.1116, referred to. 1.2. The facts like that there was time lag of 40-45 E minute after appellant had come from the office of Higher Officer after c
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