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ARUN NIVALAJI MORE versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 301 · Decided: 08-08-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.P. MATHUR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

ARUN NIVALAJI MORE 
A 
V. 
ST A TE OF MAHARASHTRA 
AUGUST 8, 2006 
[G.P. MATHUR AND R.V. RAVEENDRAN, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860: Sections 299, 300 Thirdly, 302 and 304 Part I. 
Murder-Culpable homicide-When culpable homicide is murder-The 
licence of the accused as a commission vendor in a catering unit was cancelled C 
by the deceased-Thereafter, the accused went to the office of the deceased 
and assaulted him with a knife-A constable gave a chase to the accused and 
apprehended him and a blood-stained knife was recovered from his pocket-
The deceased gave two separate dying declarations before PW-I and PW-12 
and a formal dying declaration was also recorded by the Deputy Superintendent D 
of Police-Jn these statements, the deceased clearly stated that the accused 
had assaulted him with a knife-Jn the opinion of the doctor the injuries had 
been caused by a sharp elongated heavy object-ft was also stated in the 
medical opinion that the injury inflicted by the accused was sufficient in the 
ordinary course of nature to cause death-Trial Court convicted the accused 
under S. 304 Part !-But the High Court altered the conviction to one under E 
S. 302-Correctness of-Held: The word "knowledge" occurring in clause 
Secondly of S. 300 !PC imports some kind of certainty and not merely a 
probability-An offence would still fall within clause Thirdly even though the 
offender did not intend to cause death so long as the death ensues from the 
intentional bodily injury and the injuries are sufficient to cause death in the F 
ordinary course of nature-The mere fact that a dangerous or deadly weapon 
was not used or the injuries were not caused on vital part of the body may not 
necessarily take out the offence from the clutches of clause Thirdly ()( S. 300 
/PC-Hence, High Court right~y altered the convictionji"om S. 304 Part I !PC 
to that under S. 302. 
Words & Phrases: 
"Knowledge"-Meaning of-Jn the context of Clause Secondly of Section 
300 of the Penal Code, I 860. 
301 
G 
H 
302 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A 
The appellant-accused was working as a licensed commission vendor 
in the catering unit at a Railway Station. The appellant's licence was 
cancelled by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent. Thereafter, the 
appellant went to the office of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent 
and assaulted him with a knife. PW-2 saw the appellant stabbing him with 
the knife and gave direct eye-witness account of the assault made by the 
B appellant upon the Divisional Commercial Superintendent while the latter 
was sitting in his office. PW-7, a constable of RPF, gave a chase to the 
appellant and apprehended him and a blood-stained knife was recovered 
from his pocket. The Divisional Commercial Superintendent succumbed 
to his injuries. The deceased gave two separate dying declarations before 
C PW-1 and PW-12 and a formal dying declaration was also recorded by 
the Deputy Superintendent of Police. In these statements, the deceased 
clearly stated that the appellant had assaulted him with a knife. In the 
opinion of the doctor the injuries had been caused by a sharp elongated 
heavy object. It was also stated in the medical opinion that the injury 
inflicted by the appellant was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature 
D to cause death. 
The trial court convicted the appellant-accused under Section 304 
Part I of the Penal Code, 1860 holding that the case would not fall within 
the ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. However, the High Court 
E altered the conviction from Section 304 Part I to Section 302 IPC. Hence 
the appeal. 
The following question arose before the Court:-
Whether the offence committed by the appellant comes within the 
F ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC? 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1. In order to ascertain whether the offence committed by 
an accused would fall under one of the clauses of Section 304 of the Penal 
G Code, 1860 or under Section 302 IPC, attention must he focused on the 
language used by the Legislature in Sections 299 and 300 IPC, as otherwise 
irrelevant considerations come into play which affect the judgment 
resulting in failure of justice. [311-B-C[ 
2.1. First it has to be seen whether the offence falls within the ambit 
H of Section 299 IPC. If the offence falls under Section 299 IPC, a further 
ARUN NIVALAJI MORE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
303 
enquiry has to be made whether it falls in any of the clauses, namely, A 
clauses '

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