ARJUN SINGH versus MOHINDRA KUMAR & ORS.
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946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] :1963 It is · clear therefore that the discretion to be - exercised by the military officer specified in s. 125 Ram Sarup of the Act as to the trial of accused by Court Martial v. or by an ordinary court, cannot be said to be unguided The Union of by any policy laid down by the Act or uncontrolled India and another by any other authority. Section 125 of the Act . ,, --. therefore cannot, even on merits, be said to infringe 'Raghub<;r Dayal the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. J: The writ petition therefore fails and is dis- missed. Petition dismr1scd. 1963 December 13 ARJUN SINGH 1'. MOHINDRA KUMAR & ORS. (B.P. SINHA, C.J., A.K. SARKAR AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908). ss. 11 and 151 and 0. IX, rr, 3, 7 and 13-Principle ofresjudicata when applicable- "Good cause" and "sufficient cause" if different. There were three suits in two of which the appellant was defendant and in the other the plaintiff. One of the three was the main suit (in which appellant was a. defendant and the others were connected suits. They were ordered to be consolidated for the purpose of hearing and a day was fixed for pronouncing judgment. The appellant did not appear and ex parte orders were passed against him. He filed application (purporting to be under Or. IX, r. 7 Code of Civil Procedure) for setting aside the ex parte orders which were rejected. Thereupon he filed revision application before the High Court which applications were rejected. ·Within a short time he applied to the trial court for taking evidence and proceeding with the case. This application was rejected. Thereafter he filed again another application (under Or. IX, r. 13 Code of Civil Procedure) for setting aside the ex parte order alleging .. the same facts and reasons as before. The respondents raised the bar of res judicata which was accepted by the Court. On the rejection of his application he appealed to the High Court. The I I . __ L - 5 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 947 High Court also dismissed the appeal on the ground of resjudicata. The present appeal is by special leave granted by this Court. The same plea was raised before this Court and the contentions of the parties were centered on the interpretation and application of Order IX, rr. 7, 9 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Held: (i) There is no material difference between the facts to be established for satisfying the two tests of "good cause" under Or. IX, r. 3 for non appearance and "sufficient cause" under Or. IX, r. 13. (ii) The scope of the principle of res judicata is not confined to what is contained in s. 11 but is · of more general application. Res judicata could be as much applicable to different stages of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin Debi, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 590, referred to. (iii) Where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit the nature of the proceedings, the scope of the enquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached as well as the specific provision made on matters touching .such decisions are scime of the factors to be considered before the principle is held to be applicable. (iv) Or. IX, r. 7 does not put an end to the litigation nor does it involve the determination of any issues in controversy in the suit. A decision 'or direction in an interlocutory proceeding of the type provided for by Or. IX, r. 7 is not of the kind which can operate as res judicata so as to bar the hearing on the merits of an application under Or. IX, r. 13. · Sankaralinga v. Ratnasabhapati, 21 Mad. 324 and Bhaoo Patel v. Naroo, 10 C.L.R. 45, referred to. (v) For the operation of res judicata the Court dealing with the first matter must have had jurisdiction and competency to entertain and decide the issue. If the entirety of the "heariJ1g" of a suit has been completed and the court being competent to pronounce judgment then and there, adjourns the suit merely for the purpose of pronouncing judgment (as it was done in the present case) there is no adjournment for hearing and Or. IX, r. 7 could have no application and the matter would stand at the stage of Or. IX, r. 6 to be followed up bypassing of an ex parte decree mak- ing r. 13 of the only provision in Or. IX applicable. Therefore th
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