ARJAN SINGH AND ANR. versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS .
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A • B > • ~ c • D E G H •• ARJAN SINGH AND ANR. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS . October 8, 1968 [J.C. SHAH, G. K. MITTER, K. S. HEGDE AND A, N. GROVER, JJ.] Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment and Validation) Act XVI of 1962 ss. 1(2) and 7-ExP'''ssion "this Act" in s. 7-if referred to principal Act or Amendment Act-Whether s. 32-KK in- troduced into the principal Act came into force on 30th October !956 in view of provisions of s. 1 (2) or from commencement of principal Act. The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act XIII of 1955 came into force on March 6, 1955, whereby it was provided that every land owner would be entitled to select any parcel or parcels of land not ex- ceeding the permissible limit, which was fixed at 30 standard acres. The principal Act was amended in 1956 by the inclusion of Chapter 4A which provided for the Government taking ove,r the surplus lands in the hands of a land owner. Another Amendment Act III of 1959 which was made operative from January 19. 1959 incorporated into the principal Act s. 32(FF) which provided that except in certain specified cases no trans- fer or other disposition of land effected after 21st August 1956 could affect the rights of the State Government under the Act. In 1962 the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment and Validation) Act XVI of 1962 was passed. Section 7 of this Act introduced a new s. 32- KK into the principal Act whereby it was provided that land owned by a Hindu undivided family would be deemed to be land of one land owner and, a partition of land owned by such a family shall be deemed to be a disposition of land for the purposes of s. 32-FF. Section 1 (2) of the Amendment Act provided that Sections 2, 4, 5, 7 and 10 "shall be deemed to have come into force on the 30th day of October, 1956 and the re- maining provisions of this Act shall come into force at once,". The first Appellant together with his son the second Appellant and two other sons were members of a joint Hindu family which owned agri- cultural lands in Punjab. The Appellant's family divided their family property by a Registered Partition Deed on September 6, 1956 and neces- sary changes were thereafter made in the mutation register. After Act Ill of 1959 came into force, the Collector of Sangrur started proceedings under Chapter 4A of the Act for determining the surplus lands in the hands of the appellant. Despite the representations of the Appellants, the Collector ignored the partition effected in the family 'and held that about 18 standard acres were surplus in their hands. Appeals filed by the Appellants before, the Commissioner, Patiala Division and the State Government were rejected. The Appellants then challenged the orders of these authorities by a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but this was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court who took the view that as s. 32-KK had become a part of the principal Act, the words "this Act" in that section must refer to the principal Act and not to Section 7 of the Amendment Act. A Division Bench of the Hiith Court dismissed an appeal following an earlier decision of the Court in B;r SinRh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. (1963) P.L.R. 961. In the appeal to this C\'.lurt there was no dispute that if the partition entered into in the family was taken into consideration, the lands held by the different sharers would be within the permissible; limits. ' 348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1969) 2 S.C.R. HELD : The orders impugned in the writ petition must be quashed. A A reading of the various provisions of the 1962 Act show that the legislature. intended that s. 7 of that Act which intraduced s. 32-KK into the principal Act should be deemed to have come into force on the 30th October 1956. The words "this Act" in s. 7 of the Amendment Act (s. 32-KK of the principal Act) were intended to refer to the Amendment Act 'and not to the principal Act. It is true that ordinarily when a section is incorporated into the principal Act by means of an amendment, reference in that section to "this Act" means the principal Act. But in view of sub-s. (2) of s. I of the Amendment Ac,t of 1962 that cons- truction had become imp·ermissible. Every statute has to be construed as a whofo and the construction given should be 'a harmonious one. It was not permissible for the Court to proceed on the basis· that the legis- lature had enac
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