ARBIND KUMAR SINGH versus NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS.
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ARBIND KUMAR SINGH v. NAND KISHORE PRASAD & ORS. February 26, 1968 [J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] Co11stitu1io11 of India, 1950, Art. 133-'Civil Proceeding', Scope of. Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 41, 48 and 64A-Scope of-'Pass such further order as it thinks fit', Meaning of. Natural Justice-Revising authority ca/Ung /or additional evidence- . Duty to disclose to parties. In 1950-51, the appellant was plying his motor buses in Bihar. Bibar Act 17 of 1950 imposed a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles. As the imposition of the tax was found to '- invalid the appellant did not pay the tax. In 1961, the tax was reimposed by Act 17 of 1961 with effect from 1st April 1950 and the imposition was found to be valid. Therefore, the appellant was liable to pay the transport tax for 1950-51. This liability was outsanding on 15th January 1965, on which date, the Regional Transport Authority ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage be granted to him on condition that he produced a clear- ance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of the ·Order failing which the grant will stand automatically cancelled and the permit will be granted to the first respondent. As the appellant failed to .carry out the condition the permit was cancelled and given to the first res- podent. The order was confirmed by the Government, in 'revision, under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Bihar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1950, after calling for and considering a re- port from the Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, that the. transport tax was due from the appellant for 1950-51. The writ petition in the High Court to quash the Government order was dismissed. The appelJant appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution. The respondent contended that the High Coult was not competent to grant the certificate in proceedings under Art. 226; and the appellant con· tended that : (I) on the date of the order granting the permit there was no liability to pay the tax as there was no assessment; (2) the condition regarding payment of tax was invalid; (3) the Minister of Transport who dispo&ed of the revision to the Government had no right to call for any additional evidence; and (4) the report of the Dy. Commissioner of Com- mercial Taxes should have been disclosed by the Minister to the aypellant. HELD: (I) The words 'civil proceedings' in Art. 133 cover all pro- ceedinS'l which directly affect civil rights, and therefore the High Court was competent to grant the certificate in a proceeding under Art. 226 in- VQ!ving civil rights. [324 E-F] S. A. L. Narayan Row v. lshwar Lal Bhagwandas, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 190 . and Rcmesh v. Seth Genda/a/ Moti/a/ Patni, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 198, followed. (2) Under the scheme of the Act the liability to pay tax arises by statutory injunction and not from any order of assessment. Therefore, there was a liability to pay the transport tax outstanding, against the appd- •Jant, on the date of the order granting him the permit and failure to A I c D E F G H • J ARBIND KUMAR V. NANO KISHORE (Shah, I.) 323' A produce the clearance certificate in reiipect of the tax disentitled him to· the g'rant of a permit. [326 H; 327 CJ Raipur Transport Co. (P.) v. M. P. Singh, A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 36 distin- guished (3) If it be held that the grant of a permit was to be ~bject only to· such of the.matters specified under s. 47(1) (a) to (f) and to such of the B conditions as may be prescnbed under s. 48, the order of the Regional Transport Authority in the present case must be deemed to be an order refusing the permit. and. tbe appellant should have challenged, by way of appeal, the validity of the imposition of the condition relating to pay- ment of tax; he could not ignore the conditi0n subject to which the permit was aranted. [328 D-EI c ( 4) The expression 'pass such order as it thinks fit' in s 64A, as amend- ed by the Bihar Act, is not restricted to the passing of final orders. If for; the purpose of doing complete justice between the parties, the authority who hears the revision petition is satisfied that it is necessary to call for addi- tional evidence, he may do so. There is no bar in the Act or the Rules aa:ainst an appellate or revising authority taking into consideration the· additional evidence brou)tht on rncord
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