ANSUYABEN KANTILAL BHATT versus RASHIKLAL MANIKLAL SHAH AND ANR.

Citation: [1997] 3 S.C.R. 784 · Decided: 08-04-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
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ANSUYABEN KANTILAL BHATT 
v. 
RASHIKLAL MANIKLAL SHAH AND ANR. 
APRIL 8, 1997 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] 
Rent & Eviction : 
Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Co/llrol Act, 1947: 
Application for eviction of tenant on grounds of bona fide requiremellt 
and non-payment of rent-Held, in view of the protracted litigation stretching 
over 31 years, bonafide requiremelll may not exist now-Tena/II to pay an-ears 
of rent in ten bi-monthly instalments-Rent also increased with retrospective 
effect-In case the landlord's son intends to stan business after his retirement 
D he may file an application before the Rem Co11trolle1; who will pass necessaiy 
orders. 
CIVIL APPELLATE .TURJSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2104 of 
1977. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.76 of the Gujarat High 
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Court in C.R.A. No. 12 of 1971. 
M.C. Bhandare and Ms. C.K. Sucharita for the Appellant. 
C.S. Vaictyanathan, Dr. Maya Rao, Sudama Ojha for the Respon-
dents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
This is one of the classic instances of the cases holding the law that 
"delay defeats justice". the landlord filed a suit in 1966 for eviction of the 
G tenant for personal occupation and today after 31 years, we arc disposing 
of the matter at the level of this Court. It is not necessary to detail all the 
circum,tanccs leading to the filing of the petition. Suffice it to state that 
the landlord who was just to retire from private service having four unmar-
ried grown-up daughters and one son aged 24 years had filed an applica-
H tion for eviction of the tenant under the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging 
784 
, 
A.K. BHATT v. R.M. SHAH 
785 
House Rates Control Act. 1947 (for short, the 'Act'). The application was· A 
filed on two grounds, namely, one she needs the premises for personal 
occupation and the tenant also has committed default in the payment of 
the rent for more than six months. When a notice was issued by the 
landlady-appellant calling upon the respondents to vacate the premises on 
the above grounds, reply came with the allegation that he was not in arrears 
of the rents and the appellant is not in need of the premise. Thus, 
necessitated the respondent to file the suit for eviction. In the written 
statement, a defence was taken that the standard rent is much less than the 
contracted rent. As a consequence, the rent payable to the respondent was 
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less. Therefore, he has not committed default in payment of the rent. 
Though an application under Section 11 for fixation of the standard rent 
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was not filed, the determination in that behalf was made at Rs. 101 per 
month. The Rent Controller allowed the petition. But, on appeal, the 
District Judge dismissed the appeal holding that the respondent needs the 
house for personal occupation and also the default was committed by him. 
On revision, the High Court reversed the order. Thus, this appeal by D 
special leave. 
The High Court proceeded on two premises, namely, that the 
landlady was not in need of the house since her husband has by then 
become too old and secondly it was heid that the comparative hardship to 
the tenant was not taken into consideration and, therefore, the premises 
on which the appellate authority proceeded is wrong in law. The High 
Court came to the conclusion that under the contract, since the property 
tax was required to be paid by the tenant, the contract of monthly tenancy 
as well as the payment of property tax being a composite tenancy, there is 
no default in payment of the rent. Shri M.C. Bhandare, learned senior 
counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that the view taken by the 
High Court is not correct in law. He contends that bona fide recruitment 
requires to be considered at the time when the need arises and mere fact 
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that he has become old at the time when the petition came up, it is relevant 
ground. Though we find force in the contention, it need not be now decided 
due to long lapse of time of 31 years. Now, he is not in a position to set-up G 
any business. At the time when he filed the application, admittedly, he was 
54 years of age by now he is 87 years. Under these circumstances, the need 
of the landlady for her husband to set-up the business cannot be said to 
be subsisting. At that time, they had four unmarried daughters, obviously, 
he had to set-up the business but now they have already been married and H 
786 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1997) 3 S.C.R. 
A need, therefore,
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