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ANSARI & ORS. versus STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW & ORS.

Citation: [1981] 1 S.C.R. 981 · Decided: 29-10-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.A. DESAI · Disposal: Case Allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

PRAVE.EN. ANSARI & ORS. 
v. 
STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW 
& ORS. 
October, 29 1980 
[D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, sections 68-F(I}, section 68-F (I-A) and 68-F 
(1-C), interpretation of-Whe•n once the Corporation made an application for 
1emporary per mils not for the full strength but something short of it, whether 
there was no power left in the State Transport Authority to grant temporary 
fJermits to anyone else-words and phrases-The 
expression "any 
person" 
comprehends any person even other than the Corporation. 
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court 
HELD: 
1. The combined reading of section 68-F (l-A) and section 68-F (1-C) makes 
it clear that keeping in view the strength of the vehicles fixed in public interest 
by the competent authority under section 68-F (I-A), for the period intervening 
between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication 
of the approved or modified scheme, the authority should first examine the 
application for number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. 
1£ 
the Corporation has made application for temporary permits covering all the 
vacancies, the authority must grant permit to the Corporation to the exclusion 
of any other applicant, as section 68-F(l) makes it obligatory upon the State 
Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, .as the case may be, 
to grant the same. If the Corporation does not apply for all the permit9 
but only for some, the inescapable conclusion will be that for the remaining 
strength the Corporation has mad~ no application for the temporary permits 
and section 68-F (1-C) of the Act squarely being attracted, the State Tran'Sport 
Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, will have · 
to examine the application for temporary permits made by persons other than 
the Corporation and if they are found to be competent eligible and qualified! 
they may have to be granted permits for the benefit o~ the largo travelling 
public. 
That is why power to increase strength of fleet operating on the route 
is conferred under section 68-F (l·A) of the Act and has to be exercised in 
public interest meaning transport facility to travelling public. 
Jn 
this case 
there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits. 
The Corporation applied for 
only 3. It was incumbent upon · the Sta1e Transport Authority to consider 
the applications of the present appellants for the remaining four vacancies 
and grant four permits according to law. [986A-D] 
2. The expression "any person" in section 68-F (l·C) of the Motor Vehicles 
Act would· comprehend any person to mean any one other than the Corporation. 
(985A·B] 
A 
B 
c 
D 
G 
Section 68-F (l·C} caters to such a situation where a scheme bas been 
published and, therefore, the Corporation would be entitled to temporary 
H 
permits till the approved scheme is published, yet if the Corporation is unable 
to provide vehicles for the 
optimum strength fixed by the State Transport 
2-·6 S. C. India/ND/81 
982 
B 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1981] 1 S.C.R 
Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as 
the case may 
be, the 
concerned authority in exercise of power conferred 
specifically upon it· by 
section 68-F (l-C) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the 
Corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the scheme is published 
till modified or approved scheme is published. [984C·E] 
3. In interpreting the provisions of Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 
1939 it is, undoubtedly, true that the Corporation enjoys a pre.ferential 
treatment in the matter oE obtaining permits the authority under the Act must 
not ever lose sight of the fact that the primary consideration must be ihe ~ervice 
available to the travelling public. 
While interpreting the provisiom :Jf tlie 
Motor Vehicles Act, undoubtedly, the competing claims between the Corporation 
and the other private operators may 
be examined 
with 
reference to the 
provisions of the Act. 
But the overall consideration namely the service is 
for the benefit of the travelling public should 
never be 
overlooked for a 
moment. [985F·G] 
CIVIL APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2520 of 
1980. 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 
3-12-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. NIL 
of 1979. 
Y ogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellants. 
0. P~ Rana and P. K. Pillai

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