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ANILKUMAR JINABHAI PATEL (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. versus PRAVINCHANDRA JINABHAI PATEL AND ORS.

Citation: [2018] 3 S.C.R. 718 · Decided: 27-03-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.K. AGRAWAL · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 3 S.C.R.
ANILKUMAR JINABHAI PATEL (D) THR. LRs. & ANR.
v.
PRAVINCHANDRA JINABHAI PATEL AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3313 of 2018 Etc.)
MARCH 27, 2018
[R. K. AGRAWAL AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
ss. 31(5) and 34 – Arbitration award – Petition by appellant
No. 1 u/s. 34 for setting aside the award, filed – Award set aside by
District Judge for non-compliance of s. 31(5) – High Court held
that the petition u/s. 34 was time barred and hence was dismissed –
On appeal, held: Facts and circumstances of the case show that
appellant No. 1 was authorized by his family members to receive a
copy of the award and act on their behalf – Service of arbitral
award on appellant No. 1 amounts to service on his family members
(other appellants & respondent) and hence cannot plead
non-compliance of s. 31(5) – Petition u/s. 34 was therefore barred
by limitation.
s. 34 Proviso – Limitation period for – Condonation of – Held:
Proviso to s. 34 gives discretion to the Court to condone the delay
for a sufficient cause, but such discretion cannot be extended
beyond the period of thirty days – Limitation – Delay-Condonation
of.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 provides for filing of an application for setting aside an
arbitral award. Section 34(3) provides that an application for setting
aside an award shall not be entertained by the court if it is made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which the
applicant had received the arbitral award.  The proviso to Section
34 further provides that if the court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the prescribed time, it may entertain the application within
[2018] 3 S.C.R. 718
718
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a further period of thirty days ‘but not thereafter’. The words ‘but
not thereafter’ in the proviso are of mandatory nature, and couched
in the negative, and leave no room for doubt.  Proviso to Section
34 gives discretion to the court to condone the delay for a
sufficient cause, but that discretion cannot be extended beyond
the period of thirty days, which is made exclusively clear by use
of the words ‘but not thereafter’. [Paras 13 and 14] [725-E]
[726-B-D]
State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damini Construction Co.
(2007) 10 SCC 742 – relied on.
2. The undertaking by appellant No. 1, in the award dated
03.11.1996 that he and his family members agreed and approved
the award shows that he was acting for himself and on behalf of
his family members. Award dated 07.07.1996 was also received
by him for himself and on behalf of his family members.  In interim
MOU dated 29.06.1996, Appellant No. 1 signed for self and as a
power of attorney holder for his wife and his all sons and
daughters-in-law.  Challenging the award dated 07.07.1996, he
and his family members have filed a single petition under Section
34 of the Act. Likewise they have also filed a single petition for
amending the arbitration petition. Appellant No. 1 being the head
of his family, was a person directly connected with and involved
in the proceeding and was also in control of the proceeding.  Being
head of the family, he would have been the best person to
understand and appreciate the arbitral award and take a decision
as to whether an application under Section 34 of the Act was
required to be filed or not.  In such facts and circumstances,
service of arbitral award on appellant No. 1 amounts to service
on the other appellant Nos.1 (a) to 1(d) and respondent No.10
and they cannot plead non-compliance of Section 31(5) of the Act.
The application filed under Section 34 of the Act by appellant No.
1 and appellant Nos. 1(a) to 1(d) and respondent No.10 was barred
by limitation. [Paras 22, 23 and 26] [729-F-H; 730-A-B;
731-D]
Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and
Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 ; State of Maharashtra
and Ors. v. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 616 –
referred to.
ANILKUMAR JINABHAI PATEL (D) THR. LRs. v.
PRAVINCHANDRA JINABHAI PATEL
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2018] 3 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
(2007) 10 SCC 742
   relied on
Para 14
(2005) 4 SCC 239
   referred to
Para 15
(2011) 4 SCC 616
   referred to
Para 16
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3313
of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.03.2012 of the High Court
of Judicature of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition
No. 4669 

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