LexANIL KUMAR GOEL versus KISHAN CHAND KAURA
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ANIL KUMAR GOEL A ----,;,_ v. "" KISHAN CHAND KAURA DECEMBER 12, 2007 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.] B Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 --ss. 138 and 142 (b) proviso - Insertion of proviso to s. 142 (b) in 2002 extending the limitation period - On facts, successive presentation of dishonoured cheque c by payee - Events taking place much prior to 2002 - Complaint under section 138 - Maintainability of - Held: Amendment to s. I 42(b) not intended to operate retrospectively -Also, payee did not take such plea - Thus, order of High Court that complaint u/ s 138 maintainable on the ground that proviso to s. 142 (b), D empowered the court to extend the limitation period on sufficient -- I cause being shown, set aside - Proceedings pursuant to the complaint quashed. Appellant issued cheque in favour ofrespondcnt on 31.3.1998 which was dishonoured on presentation on 11.4.1998. The E respondent iss11ed a notice to the appellant on 24.4.1998. On assurance by the appellant, the cheque was again presented, but was again dishonoured on 30.9.1998. The respondent issued notice to the appellant on 13.10.1998 but the payment was not made. Thereafter, on 28.11.1998, the respondent filed a complaint u/s F 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Appellant filed application u/s 245 Cr.P.C. for discharge but the same was dismissed. Appellant then filed an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint u/s 138 of the Act on the ground that the G complaint was not maintainable in view ofs. 142 (b) of the Act. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that ~ proviso to s. 142 (b) inserted by Act 55 of2002, empowered the court to extend the limitation period on sufficient cause being 313 H 314 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [2007] 13(Addl.)S.C.R. A shown. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court ~ .>- HELD: 1.1. Before the amendment, the proviso to clause (b) of s. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was not B there. Clause (a) of the proviso to section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. This apart, in the course of business transactions it is not uncommon for a cheque being returned due to insufficient funds or similar such reasons and c being presented again by the payee after sometime, on his own volition or at the request of the drawer, in expectation that it would be encashed. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer, recourse to which, D normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh 1right and not a cause of action - accrues in his favour. Therefore, he may, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of s.ection 138, go on presenting the cheque so E as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the c~eque. (Para 6) (318-D, E, F, G] 1.2. All laws that ilffect substantive rights gene1rally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations, unless F the legislative in!ent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving y retrospective effeCt or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospeetive operation is intended. Hence, the question G whether a statutory provision has retrospective 1~ffect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is not clear then the court has to decide whether, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, retrospective effect should be given to it or not. (Para 8) (319-D, E, F] H ANILKUMARGOELv.KISHANCHANDKAURA 315 [PASAYAT, J.] Mis Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. v. Central A Government and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 87 - relied on. 2. In the instant case, there is nothing in the amendment made to s. 142(b) by Act 55 of2002 that the same was intended to operate retrospectively. In fact that was not even the stand of B the respondent. When the complaint was filed on 28.11.1998, the respondent could" not have foreseen that in future any amendment providing for extending the period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown would be enacted. Thus, the High Court's view is clearly unacceptable and is set aside. The procee
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