ANIL KHANDELWAL ETC. versus PHOENIX INDIA AND ANR.
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2416 : 2025 INSC 1069 Anil Khandelwal Etc. v. Phoenix India and Anr. (Criminal Appeal No(s). 1159-1160 of 2011) 28 August 2025 [Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the quashing petition filed by the appellants-Officers of the Bank challenging the order passed by the Magistrate issuing process against them for the offences punishable u/ss.500 and 501, Penal Code, 1860. Headnotesβ Penal Code, 1860 β ss.500, 501 β Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 β s.32, 13(2), (4) β Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 β r.8 β Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 β s.482 β Loan accounts of respondent No.1-firm were classified as non-performing assets and it was notified to repay the overdue loans with interest β Repeated intimations and demands raised but, the outstanding amounts were not clearedΒ β Eventually, Bank issued a possession notice u/s.13(4), SARFAESI Act r/w 2002 Rules, for taking symbolic possession of the immovable properties mortgaged by respondent No. 1 to secure the credit facilities β Inadvertently, the outstanding amount quoted in the possession notice was mentioned as Rs.56,15,9,294/- instead of Rs.5,61,59,294/- β Respondent No. 1 issued notice to the appellants viz., the Chairman and Managing Director, the Deputy General Manager, and the Chief Manager of the Bank, alleging defamation stating that the Bank had maliciously issued the possession notices reflecting an unrealistic and false outstanding amount of more than Rs.50 crores β Respondent No. 1 filed criminal Complaint u/ ss.499, 500 and 501, IPC β Magistrate issued process against the appellants β Quashing petition filed by the appellants, dismissed by High Court β Interference with: *βAuthor [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2417 Anil Khandelwal Etc. v. Phoenix India and Anr. Held: The Bank is a body Corporate β Appellants were arraigned as accused on the principle of vicarious liability being the persons responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Bank β However, the Bank itself, on whose behalf the alleged defamatory notice had been issued, was not arraigned as an accused in the complaintΒ β Without impleading the company itself, the prosecution against directors or officers alone is impermissible. [Para 16] 1.2 Thus, the prosecution of the appellants, without impleading the Bank as an accused in the proceedings, is ex-facie impermissible and cannot be sustained. [Para 18] 1.3 The appellants were summoned in capacity of the officers of the Bank for the offences punishable under the IPC β However, there is no concept of vicarious liability of the officers or directors for the offences under the IPC as is provided under special Penal Statutes such as The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, etc. which specifically creates such liability. [Para 20] 1.4 Accordingly, before any officer of a Bank or a body corporate can be prosecuted for an offence under the IPC on the allegation of having acted on behalf of the institution, it is incumbent upon the complainant to produce unimpeachable material indicating the precise role of the officer in the commission of the alleged offence β Mere bald assertions of vicarious liability, without foundational facts to show active participation, authorization, or deliberate omission on the part of the officer, are insufficient to justify issuance of process in such a situation β The law does not permit automatic prosecution of directors or officers merely because of their designation or official status. [Para 22] 1.5 Hence, in the absence of any specific statutory provision under the IPC creating vicarious liability, coupled with the lack of concrete allegations or material demonstrating the individual role or culpability of the appellants for the alleged defamatory notice, their prosecution cannot be sustained β Continuation of criminal proceedings merely on the basis of their official designation in the Bank would amount to a misuse of judicial process. [Para 24] 1.6 Furthermore, the appellants are entitled to the statutory protection provided u/s.32 of the SARFAESI Act, which expressly prohibits any suit, prosecution, or other legal proceedings against the Reserve Bank, the Central Registry, any secured creditor, or their officers for anything done in good fai
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